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Abstract
Consistently and comprehensively using Information Operations (IO)
capabilities as a primary weapon option within the Air Force is the next step to
operationalizing IO within the Air Force. Doctrine and official guidance have set
the variables of mission and concepts of operations, organizational structure, and
IW players in place. The missing variable to operationalizing IO and probably the
most difficult is the "how" or process of the equation.
This research will introduce a useable process that can be incorporated
within the Air Force for integrating offensive IW activities into the current and
given environment. The process is the basis for further decomposition and
identification of target aim points. In addition, it's use of effect points should aid
in focusing long-range, deliberate, and crisis action planning on the possible
desired effects on an adversary.
The research sets the stage by briefly defining the first three variables;
organization, mission, and players in which AF IW is practiced and the inherent
deliverables required. It will then introduce a view and decomposition of the
information battlespace as the basis for offensive IW activities where affecting
the information factors in order to induce a desired decision to achieve desired
effects is the overall goal.

IX

A PROCESS FOR VECTORING OFFENSIVE INFORMATION
WARFARE, AS A PRIMARY WEAPON OPTION
WITHIN THE AIR FORCE

1
1.1

Introduction

General Issues
The information environment, with it's inherit capabilities and

vulnerabilities, has continued to grow into a complex system of people, hardware,
software, processes, and information. This environment has the ability to
process, store, and transport large amounts of information in a vast array of
products and services and at speeds once unimaginable. The nation's
dependency upon these capabilities has made the country and her assets
vulnerable to potentially devastating attacks. This increasing importance to
control information has become a necessity in conducting warfare in the 21st
century. Air Force doctrine highlights this point:
"...the possession and manipulation of information itself can be a
key element of the war-winning equation. More than at any other
time in history, information has evolved from being only an adjunct
supporting primary weapon systems to, in many cases, being itself
a weapon or target."
AFDD 2-5, 1998:1-2
The above quote also underscores the important need for IW to become
"itself a weapon" to be used to deny, degrade, disrupt, or destroy an adversary's
military organization through affecting the value of information, information
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systems, and information based processes. This integration of full spectrum
Information Operations (10) must become a major focus of the Air Force's
operational art (AFDD 2-5,1998: 4).
1.2

Background
Currently there is a gap between Joint and Air Force doctrine and real world

operations in the Air Force Information Operations (I0) arena. Steps in bridging
this gap have been the finalization of guidance, definitions, and organizational
structure as outlined in Joint Pub 3-13 Information Operations, AFDD 2-5
Information Operations, AF's Concept of Operation for Information Warfare (IW),
the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, as well as, the recent compilation
of the IW Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). To solidify and lend
credence to the guidance, definitions, and structure, the AF I0 community must
take the next step and employ a theory of operations suited for use within the
operational and tactical level of operations. In order for the "IW weapon system"
to move from its current supporting function to a primary weapon option, this
theory of operations must be built upon striving to present offensive IW
capabilities as a supported primary weapon option that is considered and utilized
at every appropriate opportunity.
1.3

Problem Statement
AFDD 2-5 states, "IW capabilities should be considered and integrated

into the overall theater campaign, not just as an add on—but as a primary
capability the Air Force brings to the conflict" (AFDD 2-5,1998: 32). However, a
1-2

missing link exists in the utilization of offensive IW as a primary weapon option.
AF doctrine and official guidance has identified the variables of mission,
organizational structure, and required personnel, but not the "how". The process
equations, which translate the designs of doctrine into operational procedures
that place offensive IW capabilities in full motion as a primary weapon option in
our national arsenal, are currently undeveloped.
In order for IW to become a primary weapon option, in contrast to its
current supporting role to kinetic and traditional forms of warfare, it's capabilities
and effects must be presented and translated within the current and future
potential battlespace. The critical question is,
"How can offensive IW be integrated within the AF as a primary

weapon choice?"
This thesis attempts to address the question in two parts. First, this work
applies a combination of techniques and steps drawn from business reengineering, strategic management, and basic planning techniques, in order to
identify and define the essential factors of a new and developing organization.
These essential factors, mission, vision, goals, product(s), environment, and
deliverables are outlined in Chapter 4. This identification is a key step in being
able to transform an organization within one's current environment to a more
prominent and beneficial setting.
A shortcoming of current doctrine is the limited guidance on "how" to
"integrate" 10 at all levels. The second part of this thesis is a proposed process
developed with a focus upon the needs of its customers and the deliverables for
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its users. A process that can be used within the current Air Force structure is
developed for offensive IW.
In summary, this thesis identifies the necessary concepts and definitions
to develop a useable, useful, and systematic process to produce the appropriate
deliverables of target nominations, weaponeered targets, and effects assessment
indicators for IW. All of these pieces can serve as the foundation for developing
a baseline of knowledge needed for integrating offensive IW activities into the
current Air Force planning and execution environment. While not the final
answer in the transition of IW to a primary weapon choice at the operational
level, it does provide a roadmap for the next steps in the journey.
1.4 Approach
Field observations, interviews, and a review of available literature,
including but not limited to AF doctrine have been utilized to define the Air Force
IO community, its organization, mission, and players. The qualitative research
method of constant comparison, progressive analysis, clarification, and evolving
conclusions was used to conduct data collection and continuous analysis. With
the use of basic planning steps, strategic management techniques, and business
re-engineering analysis, the targeting cycle environment was further broken
down into customers and customer requirements, decision cycles and decision
requirements, in order to determine the essential deliverables of the AF IW
community.
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Through the incorporation of several basic concepts concerning effects
based operations, aerospace operations center (AOC) operations, target and
combat assessment analysis, a systematic process has been developed
presenting a theory of operations with the goal of presenting the capabilities of
information warfare weapons as a supported weapon system. The concepts,
definitions, and process will then be presented to a community of subject matter
experts for their review and initial assessment for use by the 10 community.

1.5 Overview
This thesis is structured in the following manner. Chapter Two presents a
literature review of the key factors describing the different areas of study
incorporated within the thesis; information operations, effects based operations,
targeting and combat assessment concepts, information value and objective
hierarchies. Chapter Three describes the methodology followed and evolving
paths taken throughout the research process. Chapter Four provides the
concepts resulting from the grounded, comparative analysis and the suggested
I0 planning process focused around the deliverables and customer needs of the
I0 planner. This portion of the work has also been tailored into a report for the
Institute of Security Studies, the AF Research Laboratories—Human
Effectiveness Branch, and the 23rd and 39th Information Operations Squadron.
Chapter Five provides the analysis and findings of two assessment feedback
activities performed. Chapter Six outlines overall conclusions, insights, and
future research opportunities and recommendations. In addition, several
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appendixes are included to support this research and to act as repositories of the
presentation and collection instruments used. Appendix A outlines the additional
research developed in an effort to validate the IW Weaponeering & Force
Application phase of the developed process. In addition, pilot and preliminary
study results, and a brief initial analysis of findings are included. Appendix B
contains a table of the modified measures of effectiveness items and a summary
of offensive action definitions that accompanies the IW Battlespace. Appendix C
is used as a repository of the research instruments used during this study.
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2
2.1

Literature Review

Introduction
Information Operations (IO) and its offensive component, Information

Warfare (IW), have posed many challenges to the current operational and tactical
environment of the Air Force. As suggested by several documents offering
guidance in the integration of IO into the structure of the Air Force, it is essential
for IO to be incorporated throughout the different levels of operations; strategic,
operational, and tactical. This chapter provides an overview of the planning and
targeting processes and defines the array of aspects that make up the key
factors investigated within this research. These key factors are the different
levels of operations, the Information Operations environment, the Aerospace
Operations Center; effects based operations, targeting and combat assessment
concepts, and the development of an environment assessment research model.
2.2

The Levels of Operations; Strategic, Operational, and Tactical
"Offensive IO may be conducted at all levels of war, inside and outside the

traditional military battlespace" (JP 3-13,1998:11-9). The boundaries between the
different levels are not always distinct and one must always be sensitive to the
effects of an IW action upon the other levels of war. Consideration of the effect
should not be isolated to the level being planned (JP 3-13,1998:1-2).
Table 2-1 presents the definitions of the different levels of war or
operations. It is included here to provide the reader with a reference of terms
that will be used throughout this thesis.
2-1

Table 2-1. Levels of Operations—Summary of Definitions
Levels of Operations
Strategic Level of Operations

Operational Level of Operations

Tactical Level of Operations

2.3

Definitions
The level of war at which a nation, often as a
member of a group of nations, determines national
or multinational (alliances or coalition) security
objectives and guidance, and develops and uses
national resources to accomplish these objectives.
Activities at this level establish national and
multinational military objectives; sequence
initiative; define limits and assess risks for the use
of military and other instruments of national power;
develop global plans or theater war plans to
achieve these objectives; and provide military
forces and other capabilities in accordance with
strategic plans
(JP1-02, 1994:439)
The level of war at which campaigns and major
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained
to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or
areas of operations. Activities at this level link
tactics and strategy by establishing operational
objectives needed to accomplish the strategic
objectives, sequencing events to achieve the
operational objective, initiating actions, and
applying resources to bring about and sustain
these events. These activities imply a broader
dimension of time or space than do tactics; they
ensure the logistic and administrative support of
tactical forces, and provide the means by which
tactical successes are exploited to achieve
strategic objectives.
(JP 1-02, 1994:335)
The level of war at which battles and engagements
are planned and executed to accomplish military
objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.
Activities at this level focus on the ordered
arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in
relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve
combat objectives.
(JP 1-02, 1994:453)

Information Operations
Cornerstones of Information Warfare, released in 1995, was the Air

Force's first public interpretation of Information Warfare. It led the refinement
and growth of what is known as Information Operations. In addition to
2-2

"Cornerstones", the most notable Air Force guidance and documents for
Information Operations are the AF Doctrine Document 2-5 Information
Operations (AFDD 2-5) published in August 1998, and the USAF Concept of
Operations for Information Warfare (CONOPS) released in December of 1999.
These documents have redefined the concepts and definitions of IO and IW
since the release of "Cornerstones" in 1995. These documents are used
extensively as guidance to the IO environment, structure, and definitions.
2.3.1 The Structure and Definitions of Information Operations
AFDD 2-5 is a document that continues to build the stage for the growth
and refinement of Information Operations within the Air Force. Written at the
doctrine (highest) level of AF policymaking, AFDD 2-5 defines the two major
elements of Information Operations; Information-in-Warfare and Information
Warfare. Figure 2-1, taken from AFDD 2-5 is the AF Information Superiority
Construct and illustrates the concept of AF Information Operations in support of
one of AF's core competencies, Information Superiority. This construct outlines
the structure of the IO components within the AF and its essential and supporting
role to achieving Information Superiority.

2-3

Air Force Information Superiority Construct

Precision Navigation & Positioning
Other Information Collection/
Dissemination Activities

PSYOP
Electronic Warfare
Military Deception
Physical Attack
Information Attack

Information Assurance
OPSEC
Counterintelligence
Counter PÜYOP
Electronic Protection
Counterdeception

Source: AFDD 2-5, 1998: 3

Figure 2-1. AF Information Superiority Construct

Information Superiority is not a new concept, but has evolved into more
than just an end state. Joint Vision 2020 extends the importance of Information
Superiority as a vital support function in the obtainment of superior knowledge
and decision superiority (JV 2020, 2000:11). Table 2- 2 includes the definition of
Information Superiority, as well, as other IO related terms. These terms are
included here as a brief review and reference of the key terms within the
information environment.
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Table 2- 2. Key Terms within the Information Environment
Definitions of Information Related Terms
Information Superiority (IS)
The capability to collect, process, and
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information while exploiting or denying an
adversary's ability to do the same.
(JP 1-02, 1994:223)
The ability to control and exploit information
to our nation's advantage.
(AF 2020, 2000: 5 )
Information Operations (IO)
Those actions taken to affect an adversary's
information and information systems while
defending one's own information and
information systems.
(JP 1-02, 1994:223)
Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend,
or attack information and information systems
and include both information-in-warfare and
information warfare.
(AFDD2-5, 1998:41)
Information-ln-Warfare (IIW)
Involves the AF's extensive capabilities to
(Gain and Exploit)
provide global awareness throughout the
range of military operations based on
integrated intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets; its information
collection/dissemination activities; and its
global navigation and position, weather, and
communications capabilities.
(AFDD 2-5, 1998:41)
Note: Joint Doctrine does not recognize the term IIW
The information required to provide total
battlespace awareness, superior battlespace
knowledge, in order to achieve decision
superiority. IIW includes information about
the adversary, as well as oneself.
(Proposed definition)
Information Warfare
Information operations conducted during time
(Attack and Defend)
of crises or conflict to achieve or promote
specific objectives over a specific adversary
or adversaries.
(JP 1-02, 1994: 224)
Information operations conducted to defend
one's own information and information
systems, or to attack and affect an
adversary's information and information
systems.
(AFDD 2-5, 1998:42)
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Joint and AF doctrine are referenced and included in Table 2- 2 in order to
highlight the differences that may exist between these two levels. One important
distinction is that Information Operations, as viewed by the Air Force, is made up
of two separate and distinct pillars; Information-ln-Warfare and Information
Warfare.
Information-ln-Warfare (IIW). The definition in AFDD 2-5 (given in Table
2- 2) is unlike other definitions and seems to only describe the capabilities that
provide IIW instead of stating an action or a specific capability. In an attempt to
align the definition of IIW with the other terms within 10, the following is the
proposed definition to be used within this research.
IIW is the information required to provide total battlespace
awareness, superior battlespace knowledge, in order to achieve
decision superiority. IIW includes information about the adversary,
as well as oneself.
Battlespace awareness and knowledge is obtained through the collection,
organization, and analysis of information in which a relative and comprehensive
view of the playing field(s) is developed. This comprehensive view would enable
all combat planners of various weapon systems to be able to allocate their
weapons' capabilities against the critical nodes of the adversary's organizational
system. The ability to see a clear battlespace would lead to the ultimate goal of
superior battlespace knowledge and decision superiority within the battlespace.
Information Warfare (IW). The key focus on IW is the elements of defend
and attack. One of the key differences between the two elements of IW is that
the defend side is always engaged (AFDD 2-5,1998: 42). In addition, defensive
2-6

actions require everyone's total cooperation and diligence within the system in
order to keep the system secure. The old adage applies, "A chain is as strong as
its weakest link". The security of a system is only as strong as its weakest
member. Offensive actions, however, can be executed by one or many, upon
one or many, and with a varied objective, intensity, persistence, or time interval.
It is important to ensure both elements of IW must be considered, integrated, and
be accomplished in support of the other. Each element must be planned and
executed in concert (AF CONOPS, 1999:4).
The pillars of IO, IIW and IW, must be closely integrated with each other
and with all aerospace functions; reach, power, awareness, and knowledge. One
must remember that IW missions are the actions taken within the adversary or
ones own battlespace that affects the shape of the battlespace. IIW, on the other
hand, provides a relevant and evolving view of the shape of the battlespace. The
emphasis on IO and the need for the integration of IO at the operational and
tactical levels is key to the war-winning equation. IO must evolve from being only
an adjunct supporting primary weapon systems, to being itself a weapon or target
(AFDD 2-5,1998: 2). A key battlespace of this century will be the information
realm.
2.3.2 The Environment of AF IO
The release of USAF CONOPS for IW was the next step the AF took to
describe "how" the Air Force employs IW into existing functions. It outlined the
need for the AF efforts to focus on implementing IW capabilities through
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warfighting component commands in support of joint warfighting commands
(AFDD 2-5, 1998: 7). Another requirement is that "IW activities and operations
must be integrated within the normal campaign planning and execution process"
(AFDD 2-5, 1998: 7). The purpose of the CONOPS was to outline the mission,
the organizational structure, and those with primary responsibilities for IO within
the AF community. These elements are key to this thesis and are developed in
the following sections.
The Mission ofAF 10. The Air Force's vision and mission for 10 is to
establish and maintain information superiority over the adversary and to provide
the best battlespace information to the right place—anywhere, anytime (AF
CONOPS, 1999: iii). Offensive IW activities are conducted to control the
information environment to acquire and maintain information superiority,
therefore, enabling the accomplishment of theatre and mission objectives (AF
CONOPS, 1999:1). Coordination and synchronization of defensive and
offensive actions are essential to incorporate full spectrum IO capabilities across
the entire battlespace (AF CONOPS, 1999: 4).
Both Joint and Air Force doctrine and guidance consistently compliment
each other in identifying the mission of IO as a means to acquiring information
superiority and the need to integrate and operationalize IW activities within the
appropriate service's organizational structure.
In light of the overall AF mission for IO, offensive IW actions focus on the
manipulation (denial, disruption, and degradation) or destruction of information in
order to support efforts to affect the desired strategic, operational, and tactical
2-8

objectives or effects.

The mission to integrate 10, as stated in the AF

CONOPS, is a difficult task that will require changes within the AF 10 and IW
organizational structure, its mission, its personnel, and its process. The primary
focus of the tactical level is to deny, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise control an
adversary's use of information (JP 3-13,1998,11-11).
In addition, IW activities and operations must be integrated within the
normal campaign planning and execution process, making the consideration and
use of IW second nature (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 7). To fully exploit the potential
power of IW, it must become a primary weapon system of consideration and use
in the achievement of strategy and objectives at all levels of operations.
The Organizational Structure. The organizational structure of I0 at the
operational and tactical level of the USAF unfolded through the finalization of the
Air Force Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for IW in December 1999. This
structure was set by the incorporation of the IW flight embedment within selected
MAJCOMS and Numbered Air Forces (NAF) across the world. These flights
have become part of the NAF while in-garrison and are incorporated as specialty
teams within the deployed Aerospace Operations Center (AOC) (AF CONOPS,
1999:11). The structure, purpose, and mission of the AOC is the driving force
on how IW activities can be incorporated into the Air Force as a primary weapon
option. In this situation, the IW Flights are the primary "customers" of this
research. In order to meet a customer's needs, one must understand the
organizational structure of AF I0, and have insight into the AOC's structure and
major processes. The next section provides this insight.
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The Aerospace Operations Center (AOC). The AOC is the senior
operations center of the Theater Air Control System (TACS) and the focal point
for the Command and Control (C2) of air forces (AFI 13-1 AOC, 1999:10). It
provides the facility and personnel to accomplish planning, directing, and
coordinating theater air operations (AFI 13-1AOC, 1999:10). The organization
and processes of the AOC must be able to cover the entire range of
responsibilities from campaign planning to daily Air Tasking Order (ATO)
execution (AF113-1 AOC, 1999:16). In short, the responsibility of the AOC is to
perform a complex set of processes. The AF instruction for operational
procedures for the AOC describes the process as follows:
"Daily planning for the employment of forces in combat is a
complex process of integrating force capabilities and limitations
against enemy vulnerabilities to achieve optimum results in an
ever-changing tactical environment".
AFI 13-1AOC3
The basic AOC organizational structure consists of a director and four
divisions; strategy, combat plans, combat operations, and air mobility. The
overall tasks of these divisions are described by the functions of the Aerospace
Plan Development process.
The Aerospace Plan Development is the underlying process of the AOC
and consists of four major functions (AFI 13-1 AOC, 1999: 17). Each of these
functions plays a critical role in the accomplishment of the AOC's mission. Table
2- 3 summaries each of these functions.
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Table 2- 3. Description of AOC Functions

AOC Functions
Aerospace Strategy Development and
Articulation

ATO and ATO Production

ATO Execution

Operational Assessment

Description
This function incorporates many
diverse subtasks to include theater
campaign planning, preparation of the
battlespace at the strategic and
operational levels to planning
considerations of target selection,
mission execution and
synchronization/timing, and weapon
and resource availability.
The production of timely, coordinated,
and executable air tasking and air
control orders.
The monitoring, executing, and
adjusting of the operations for the
current air tasking order.
The continuous evaluation of the
results of operations based on desired
effects to achieve desired objectives.
Source: AFI13-1AOC3, 1999; 17-22

Within the AOC there are a number of standardized processes used to
synchronize the efforts of the Center across the divisions. The most prominent is
the Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle, which provides for the efficient and effective
employment of joint air capabilities/forces made available (JP 3-56.1,1994: IV-4).
The ATO is the detailed plan for the application of air resources, which
encompasses unit mission data, unit remarks, and special instructions. It is a
critical, time-sensitive document that tasks and authorizes units in the application
of air power resources.
Figure 2- 2 highlights the major milestones within the ATO cycle in its
normal 72-hour sequential timeline.
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ATO-Air Tasking Order
MAAP-Master Air Attack Plan
JIPTI—Joint Integrated Priority Target List
Source: 8AF Blue Flag Briefing Slides, 2000

Figure 2- 2. Sequential depiction of the Joint ATO Cycle

Deeply intertwined within the ATO process is the targeting cycle. This
process integrates requirements, capabilities, and efforts of all command levels.
It is an analytical and systematic approach that matches available air assets,
resources, and capabilities to threat vulnerabilities of target sets or aimpoints to
accomplish objectives.
Figure 2- 3 is an illustration of the targeting cycle and the incorporation of
the major products of the ATO cycle.
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Summary of the Targeting Cycle and Major ATO product deliverables
Source: 8AF Bine Fltg Briefing Slides, 2000

Figure 2- 3. Targeting Cycle and ATO Product Deliverables

Both the ATO and the targeting cycles work hand-in-hand to provide an
efficient and effective means for planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking
air missions with the end result of meeting the stated strategy and objectives.
Figure 2- 4 places each of the cycles side by side to illustrate how each
compliment each other within the AOC environment.
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Figures 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 illustrate the AOC's organizational structure and
processes that dictate timing and product requirements. In addition, to fully
exploit the full spectrum of available weapons and capabilities, there are several
deliverables that evolve from the targeting cycle that the IO planner must
produce inputs to in order for the ATO to incorporate IO capabilities.
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Figure 2- 5, highlights the phases requiring 10 planner inputs, the specific
inputs, and deliverables into the planning cycles of the AOC.
Manpower. To obtain the goal of information operations (attaining a
degree of information superiority, which allows us to collect, control, exploit, and
defend information without effective opposition) the Air Force has created teams
of experts in the basic elements of 10; Information-ln-Warfare (IIW) and IW
(defensive and offensive) (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 2). These teams, termed IW Flights,
are located within selected MAJCOMs and Numbered Air Forces. These IW
Flights are intended to provide the command organization with operational IW
planning and implementation capabilities within the Air Force (AF CONOPS,
1999:11).
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Each flight consist of a cross-functional team of experts in order to
facilitate deliberate and crisis action planning and contingency execution across
the full spectrum of offensive and defensive IW activities. During contingency
operations, the flight is deployed as a specialty team within the AOC and
represents the IW capability within all four divisions of the AOC; strategy, combat
plans, combat operations, and air mobility (AF CONOPS, 1999:11).
2.4

Effects Based Operations
The concept of effects based operations is paramount to the effective

integration and use of offensive IW actions and weapons as a primary option.
AFDD 2-5 states, "commanders must focus on the strategic, operational, and
tactical effects desired in any particular situation and bring to bear the right mix of
all capabilities to achieve those effects" (AFDD 2-5,1998: 3). Effects based
operations, as defined by a draft product titled Concept of Operations for Effects
Based Operations, is an "approach to planning, executing, and assessing military
operations upon on the desired effects of an action(s)" (EBO-Draft, 2001: 2).
"Fundamental to AF's success is its ability to focus on the effects
desired to achieve campaign objectives, at all levels of operations.
It holds true for IO as for any other air and space capability".
Planners should clearly define the desired effect, then identify the
optimum capability for achieving that effect."
AFDD 2-5, 1998:27-28
Joint Vision 2010 and 2020's operational concept of Precision
Engagement is effects based and relevant to all types of operations. The Air
Force highlighted its importance by identifying it as an AF core competency. In
addition, the AF IO community must also focus on accomplishing precision
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engagement. "Precision engagement is the ability of forces to locate, surveil,
discern, and track objectives or targets, select, organize, and use the correct
systems; generate desired effects: assess results; and reengage with decisive
speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, throughout the full
range of military operations". (JV2020, 2000: 28) A key to precision
engagement is achieving an appropriate level of information superiority.
2.5

Targeting Cycle Concepts
The targeting cycle is a decision-planning framework used at both the joint

and Air Force levels of planning and execution. As mentioned earlier, the
targeting cycle, along with the ATO cycle, drives all planning functions within the
AOC. It is a major, deeply engrained process that provides structure to a chaotic
scene of activity. Due to the targeting cycle's extensive use within the AOC, the
given environment that the IW Flights will operate, it is incorporated into this
research in two capacities. First, the targeting and ATO cycles are used as a
basis to analyze the environment and in determining the deliverables within this
environment. Second, the targeting cycle is used as a guide for the proposed
process focused on customer needs and the applicable deliverables.
Several other targeting concepts are also used to help in identifying the
needed weapon characteristics of offensive IW actions. The concepts, target
sets, delivery tactics, delivery platform, and payload also help to align offensive
actions into more plausible, identifiable, and measurable units. The identification
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of these important weapon characteristics helps to further decompose the IW
action into "aerospace" terms as used within the Aerospace Operations Center.
2.5.1 Target, Target System, and Target Set
The target is the basic starting point of which many other targeting
processes are based on. In its simplest form, "a target is a thing or place to be
aimed at or hit" (AFP 14-210,1998:126). Several other definitions are described
and used tending to a broaden scope of a target. The first states "a target that is
a geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction
by military forces" (AFP 14-210,1998:127). Another useful definition borrowed
from the intelligence community is that a target is a country, area, installation,
agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed (AFP 14210, 1998: 127).
The target system is another important concept. The target system is'
defined by describing two similar, but distinct definitions. A target system
includes all targets that are functionally related within a particular geographic
area or any group of related targets that will produce a particular effect if
destroyed (AFP 14-210, 1998: 18).
A target set was not formally defined within the targeting literature, but is
used within the AF Concept of Operations for IW and within many informal
discussions throughout the research. A definition was developed in order to
reflect the meaning used by participants and researcher. The term "set" can be
defined as "a group of persons or things classed or belonging together"
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(Websters, 1991: 520). This definition for set was added to the simplest definition
of target, a thing or place to be aimed at or hit. This combination yielded a
description of a target set that describes its use in the CONOPS and discussions
within the IO community. A target set is a group of persons or things belonging
together that can give focus and aim for fulfilling specific command or mission
objectives.
2.5.2 Tactic, Platform and Payload
Establishing weapon requirements and selecting the best available
weapon requires knowledge about our weapon capabilities and limitations. This
knowledge is not always straightforward and is often classified. Throughout the
open literature, there is very little available that formally defined any type of
weapon characteristics. The definitions used in this study are described below.
Tactics or Methods. Tactics and methods tend to be spoken
interchangeably and seem to be readily accepted as a way of doing anything or a
process. A definition of tactics was found and shows us a different view.
"Tactics is defined as the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in
relation to each other and/or the enemy in order to use their full potentialities"
(JP1-02, 1994: 452). In order to consistently identify the "ordered arrangement
and maneuvers" of an IW weapon system, when used within this research,
tactics will describe, as a bare minimum, an effect point, the level of effect of
deny, degrade, disrupt, and destroy, and the parameters to consider. Other
specific considerations may also be incorporated.
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Platform. Although referred to within the US Intelligence Targeting Guide,
delivery platform is not specifically defined in the applicable literature. The
definition used in this study is that a platform is the equipment, system, signal, or
person used to transport the product or action to the intended target.
Payload or Munition. Munition has several meanings, dependent upon
one's view of the battlespace. In its most restricted meaning, it is just another
word for ordnance. With the above definition in mind and a focus on the 10
planner, payload can be defined as the active agent or effect mechanism.
2.6

The Information Warfare Battlespace
A battlespace is defined as, 'The commander's conceptual view of
the area and factors, which he must understand to apply combat
power, protect the force, and complete the mission. It
encompasses all applicable aspects of air, sea, space, and
information operations."
AFDD 1 AF Basic Doctrine, 1997 (79)

Analysis of a battlespace can be described in four elements; aerospace,
surface, information, and the human dimension. Three of the four elements can
be further divided, respectively into sub-elements of air and space, land and sea,
and data, systems, and functions (AF IPB, 1999: 5).
Since the release of AFDD 1 in 1997, there has been a further
formalization and decomposition of a battlespace for information by the
identification of components of information and information systems (AFDD 2-5,
1998: 2). In comparison, at the joint level, the battlespace is described as human
factors, links, and nodes.
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The human factors are those affecting human decision processes.
The links are the information and information systems used to
support decision-making. The nodes are those information and
information systems used to process information and implement
decisions.
JP3-13, 1998:11-13

Another decomposition exists of the battlespace where individual
attributes are quantifiable, operational, and understandable (Doyle, 1998: 31).
This decomposition was first introduced by Capt Michael P. Doyle in 1998. He
applied a Value Focused Thinking approach to the information realm, which was
divided into information, information based processes, and information systems.
Two hierarchies, Figure 2- 6 and Figure 2- 7, resulted from his study. They are
called the Value Hierarchy for the Information Realm and Objective Hierarchy for
Offensive IO, respectively. The value hierarchy decomposed the information
realm to reflect the fundamental objectives and values of the decision maker
(Doyle, 1998:3-1).
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The Information Realm
(That Part That Affects Politico-Military Decision Making)
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Secure
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(Is the Analysis Appropriate)
Focus
(The Direction, Selection, and ID)
Resilience
(Robustness, Perturbation Response)

Source: Capt Michael Doyle, AFIT Thesis, 1998
Figure 2- 6. Value Hierarchy for the Information Realm

Applying the objectives of offensive IO to the value hierarchy developed
the second product. The resulting hierarchy applied a consistent view of
objectives of offensive actions, which attacked and removed value from these
attributes. Figure 2- 7 represents the Objective Hierarchy of Offensive IO.
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Figure 2- 7. Objective Hierarchy for Offensive IO

In addition to the attributes, the costs of employing an action must also be
taken into account. This is represented below by Figure 2- 8.
Minimize
Cost

r

T

Minimize
Friendly
Personnel at
Risk

Maintain
Sensitive
Information
Security

Maximize
Weapon
System
Survivability

Minimize
Collateral
Damage

Source: Capt Michael Doyle, AFIT Thesis, 1998.
Figure 2- 8. Cost Hierarchy for Offensive IO

Another aspect that makes these hierarchies valuable is the associated
measures of effectiveness. Appropriate measures of effectiveness attributes
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were developed for each attribute and costs. These were developed with 10 and
operational experts from the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (now
the Joint Information Operations Center) and US Special Forces Command.
Each measure identifies a tangible measurement that can be used to assess an
effect upon the identified and appropriate attribute.
Value Focused Thinking is a decision analysis approach that requires the
decomposition of an environment to a consistent, non-repeatable, and
operational level where actual single dimension measures can be determined
and used. Capt Doyle's decomposition and resulting hierarchies and measures
of effectiveness are presented as the basis for further refinement and the
identification of the IW battlespace. The use of a modified objective hierarchy will
be presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Modifications were made to
accommodate a refocusing of the 10 primary goal at the operational and tactical
levels of operation.
2.7

Combat Assessment Concepts
"The time to begin thinking about assessment is before mission execution,

not afterwards" (AFP 14-210, 1998: 67). Combat assessment is an on-going,
dynamic feedback activity that evaluates combat operations effectiveness in
achieving objectives. A comparison of the action's results to the objectives
determines mission success or failure and drives current and future targeting
decisions. This type of assessment is also required for offensive IW actions.
There are three sub-assessment types used for traditional weapon systems
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called Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), Mission Assessment (MA), and
Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA) (AFP 14-210,1998: 30-31).
2.7.1 Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
"BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from
the application of military force, either lethal or non lethal, against a
predetermined objective. It can be applied to all types of weapon
systems and through out the range of military operations."
AFP 14-210, 1998:71
To be effective, BDA must be tailored to the decision makers. The
traditional BDA is further broken down into three lower level assessment types,
Physical Damage, Functional Damage, and Target System Assessment.
Physical Damage Assessment. This assessment is a post attack, target
analysis and estimation of the extent of physical damage to the target (AFP 14210,1998:71).
Functional Damage. Functional damage takes into account and estimates
the remaining functional or operational capability of an object or facility. This
type of assessment is usually inferred from the assessments of physical damage.
(AFP 14-210, 1998:71)
Target System Assessment. A target system, as defined earlier includes
all targets that are functionally related within a particular geographic area or any
group of related targets that will produce a particular effect if destroyed (AFP 14210,1998:18). A target system assessment is an estimation of the overall
impact against the system (AFP 14-210,1998: 72).
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2.7.2 Mission Assessment (MA)
This type of assessment addresses the effectiveness of operations of a
type of mission. For example, some of the types of missions are those of
interdiction, counterair, or maritime support. Although assessment is usually
concerned with the cumulative damage to targets, mission assessment is more
concerned with the effectiveness of the overall mission upon enemy activities.
"The mission is successful if the enemy is reacting as intended (AFP 14-210,
1998:75).
2.7.3 Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA)
Munitions Effectiveness Assessment is concerned with both munitions
data and platform delivery conditions. It is a performance-based assessment
that compares the expected performance to the actual performance (AFP 14210,1998:74).
2.8

The Operational Environment Assessment Model
A model was built to accommodate the key factors and constraints

identified during an initial environment assessment. The model is a combination
of several different techniques common in business management. The approach
combines an overall customer oriented and process focus from business reengineering, the identification of the research object's characteristics of mission
and its surrounding environment is incorporated from strategic management, and
guidelines to identify tangible deliverables and activities are included from basic
planning steps.
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The overall model encompasses a focus on the customer and process.
For example, the research would always revert to focusing on a process and
attempting to determine what inputs were needed in order to achieve the desired
outputs that were required or had value to the customer (Hammer, 1993: 35).
In order to understand the current state of the IO planner's organization,
three key components were included within the model to ensure a
comprehensive exploration. The first two components were the mission, and the
external and internal environments being studied. The third component was
made up of defining and identifying applicable deliverables, activities, and
events. The model is graphically depicted below in Figure 2- 9.

V,&Eyents ,. -' J

Figure 2- 9. The Operational Environment Assessment Model

The two aspects borrowed from Hammer and Champy's text,
Reenginnering the Corporation, are customer and process focus. Customer
focus is maximizing customer satisfaction and is the overall goal. All decisions
should be focused upon the affects it will have upon the customer.
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Process focus is creating an output of value to the customer. This means
that processes should be organized around outcomes, not tasks and must not be
built around assumptions or any underlying beliefs (Hammer, 1993:144). It is
also important to define a process as a collection of activities that take one or
more kinds of input and creates an output that is of value to the customer
(Hammer, 1993: 35). Individual tasks within a process do not matter if the overall
process is unable to deliver the goods (Hammer, 1993: 35). These two factors
are the underlying basis of this research model.
The three key components to assess a unit's current status were
incorporated from Pearce and Robinson's text on Strategic Management.
Mission is the fundamental, unique purpose of an organization that sets the
scope of its operations (Pearce, 1988: 52). The mission of an organization
should identify the principal product or service areas and primary customer
needs to be satisfied. Understanding one's mission can clearly chart future
direction and establish a basis for organizational decision-making (Goodstein,
1993: 20). When formulating its mission, an organization must answer four basic
questions.
Table 2- 4. Questions to Ask during Mission Formulation
Mission Formulation—Questions to Answer
Generic Questions
1. What function(s) does the organization perform?
2. For whom does the organization perform this function?
3. How does the organization go about filling this function?
4. Why does this organization exist?
Source: Goodstein, 1993: 17-18
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Mission formulation within strategic management planning involves the
development of an organizational mission statement. Although the purpose of
the research was not to formulate a mission statement, the guidance given is
used to determine the unit's mission through doctrine, guidance, literature review,
informal interviews, and observations.
In addition, to identifying the mission of the IW Flight, a review of the
external and internal environments is necessary to identify concerns that may
affect the organization (Goodstein, 1993: 11). Strategic management planning
practices attempt to identify environmental items concerning industry,
government, competition, and economic, political, social, and technological
aspects.
The internal environment is important in acquiring knowledge about ones
own internal structure, culture, climate, productivity, distinctive strengths and
weaknesses (Goodstein, 1993:121). In most cases, as the different areas of an
organization are explored, a more detailed look is needed. These details are
labeled deliverables, activities, and events. A deliverable is something that will
be handed over to someone when the effort is completed. This puts the goal and
objective in a tangible form (Kelley, 1988: 24). Failure to define and agree upon
the deliverable(s) can result in an array of non-focused activity by the members
of the organization and often leading to an inability to accomplish the goal. Not
defining a tangible deliverable can lead to major disasters because no one is
able to assess if the planned actions would result in achieving the goal.
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Once the deliverables are agreed upon, activities and events and their
relationship to the deliverables must be defined. As Kelley wrote, if the step of
defining a tangible deliverable is ignored, there will be no way of knowing
whether doing an activity will result in achieving the desired goal (Kelley, 1988:
25). Activities or events are those things that are required to create the
deliverables. It is an action that produces a tangible goal or deliverable (Kelley,
1988: 25).
The general model described above was developed to accommodate the
characteristics and the problem being studied. It is a combination of a variety of
business management techniques taken from business re-engineering, strategic
management, and basic planning.

It is used to conduct and guide the research

through data collection and comparative analysis.
2.9

Summary
This review covered an array of topics in order to present a reference

point when reviewing the next two chapters; Methodology and the proposed IW
Planning Process. This has provided many definitions that have been overtaken
by the way we conduct war in an Information Age. At the operational and tactical
levels of operations, most current practices and publications are built around the
employment of traditional kinetic weapon systems. This poses a significant
problem when doctrine and other high-level directives mandate integration of
offensive IW capabilities into the current organizations.
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In order to incorporate offensive IW as a primary weapon option into the
Aerospace Operations Center, the 10 community will have to conform to the
desires and needs of its customer, the AOC.
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3
3.1

Methodology

Research Process
This chapter describes the overall methodology used to conduct, guide,

and assess the results of this research. It first outlines and identifies key factors
concerning the research object and the constraints of the operational
environment that dictated this research methodology. It then presents a model
that was developed to identify the steps required to answer the research
question, "How can offensive IW be integrated within the AF as a primary
weapon option". In order to manage the many facets of this research, the
research was categorized into five stages, each being the basis for the next
phase. These stages are identified below.
Stage 0—Initial Assessment of the Research Environment
Stage I—Determination of the External Environment
Stage II—Process Development
Stage III—Assessment of the Developed Process
Stage IV—Analysis of Findings
The chapter contains a description of the model and each stage of
the research. Table 3- 4, located at the end of the chapter,
summarizes Stages 1-4, the data collection type, and the research
results.
3.2

Stage 0—Baselining the Initial Research Environment
In order to perform a comprehensive analysis of the inputs of the AF IO

community, several important factors were identified through an initial literature
review and informal interviews. The initial research environment included the
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identification of the primary and secondary research objects, the problem
statement, and the environmental constraints and assumptions. The findings are
summarized in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1. Initial Environment Assessment
Who or What
Research Object-Primary
Research ObjectSecondary
Problem

IO Planners
Aerospace Operations
Center (AOC)
How to integrate offensive
IW within the current
environment
Constraints/Assumptions IO Planner is a part of the
AOC
IO Planner must work
within AOC environment
IO Planner is the expert of
new capability (IIW and
IW)

Position or Affect within
Environment
Supplier to the AOC
Customer/Environment
Accomplishment of mission of IO
Planner
No guidance on HOW to be part
of AOC
IO Planner should conform to
the given environment
New capability not explicitly
defined

From this initial assessment, it became clear that the focus of research
was on the IO Planners and their performance within the Aerospace Operations
Center (AOC). As in any research environment, several constraints also became
apparent. These constraints were that the IO Planner must conform to the AOC
environment and that expert knowledge of IW capabilities was expected. This
initial assessment of the problem statement and constraints also dictated a
qualitative research methodology that was flexible and allowed for a continuous
evolution of comparisons and analysis. In order to maintain study boundaries
and give structure to the research effort, the operational environment
assessment model was developed and used in Stage 0.
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3.2.1 The Operational Environment Assessment Model
A model was built to accommodate the key factors and constraints
identified during the initial assessment. The model is a combination of several
different techniques common in business management. The approach combines
an overall customer orientation and process focus from business re-engineering.
The identification of the research object's characteristics of mission and its
surrounding environment is incorporated from strategic management. The
simple identification guidelines of tangible deliverables and activities come from
basic planning steps.
Three key components are used to assess a unit's current status.

These

components are the unit's mission, it's environment (external and internal), and
the applicable deliverables, activities, and events of the organization (Goodstein,
1993:17-18). These key components are incorporated into the environment
assessment model, which is depicted below in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1. The Operational Environment Assessment Model
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Customer and process focus are the two underlying factors of this
research model. In addition to being used in Stage 0, this customer and process
focus is continuously used and applied throughout the research to ensure the
overall data collection, comparisons, and analysis was properly focused on the
customer, the AOC.
When formulating its mission, Goodstein suggests, an organization must
answer four basic questions. Table 3-2 outlines both the generic and IW Flight
specific questions used in this research.
Table 3- 2. A Summary of Mission Formulation Questions

Mission Formulation—Questions to Answer
Generic Questions
1

What function(s) does the organization
perform?
2 For whom does the organization
perform this function?
3 How does the organization go about
filling this function?
4 Why does this organization exist?

IW Flight Questions
What is the stated vision and mission of
the Flight?
Who are their customers?
How does the Flight accomplish this
function?
Is there a reason for the Flight to exist?
Why?
Source: Adopted from Goodstein, 1993:17-18

In addition to asking these questions in an attempt to determine the
mission of the IW Flight, a review of the external and internal environments was
conducted. This research focused heavily on the external environment of the
organization in regards to the customer's mission, needs, structure, and decision
cycles.
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The internal environment is also important in acquiring knowledge about
ones own internal structure, culture, climate, productivity, distinctive strengths
and weaknesses (Goodstein, 1993:121). Since the IW flights are relatively new,
internal and individual structures are still being developed. For this reason an
exploration into the internal workings of the flight was purposely limited at this
time. It is included in the model as a dotted area to emphasize its importance.
Once the flights develop further this internal environment should be studied
before any significant change is implemented. Knowledge about the unit's
internal culture and weaknesses could help in identifying potential acceptance or
resistance problems of a policy or vision change of the organization.
As the different areas of the external environment were explored it
became clear that a more detailed investigation of these elements was required.
The model identifies these as the deliverables, activities, and events. Stage I
attempts to identify the deliverables, activities, and events within the external
environment affecting the flight. It does this by determining the external
environment of the flight.
3.3

Stage I—Determination of the External Environment
In order to determine a baseline of understanding of the AF IO

environment, current literature, AF and joint doctrine and guidance helped to
establish a preliminary overview and were accomplished in Stage 0. This initial
baseline acted as the starting point for comparison and analysis in an attempt to
identify the basic elements of the organization; mission, organizational structure,
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and personnel. As mentioned in the earlier model description, the focus on
process and customer would help to determine what the unit must do and then
how to do it. It should ignore "what is" and concentrate on "what should be"
(Hammer, 1993: 2).
The next step was to answer two broad questions in order to find out what
were the deliverables, activities, and events of an IO planner. These questions
were:
1. "What decisions or recommendations is the IO planner required to
make?"
2. "What are their product deliverables?"
Each question seemed logical and separate, but after closer investigation,
they could not be answered without considering the IO Planner's customer, the
AOC. Focus had to be placed upon the AOC's needs, the AOC's environment,
and the AOC's decision cycles. Although the literature and guidance explicitly
stated what the flight's mission and deliverables were, many iterations of data
collection and comparative analysis were required to reveal a true picture of what
these components consisted of. The data collection included interviews, a field
observation at an AOC exercise, as well as reviews of IO and AOC training
lesson objectives and plans. This investigation resulted in deliverables of target
nominations, weaponeered targets, and assessment indicators.
Once these were solidified, several activities and events became apparent
as required for the production of these deliverables. The first was the knowledge
requirements needed to be able to develop target nominations, weaponeered
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targets, and assessment indicators. The second activity or event identified was
the processes and decision cycles of the AOC. The third activity or event that
was required was the identification of the process or procedure that would
produce the outputs or deliverables in a standardized or systematic way. Table
3- 4, located at the end of this chapter, summarizes the final results of the
research.
3.4

Stage II—Process Development
In order to fill the gap identified in Stage I of the research, the

development of a process to aid the 10 planner in his or her ability to plan and
produce the deliverables important within the AOC environment was necessary.
In addition, the distinction between using 10 as a supporting function to kinetic
and traditional systems verses a supported and primary option required a slightly
different view then currently being used. This view dictated a proactive and a
purely offensive mode, unlike a supporting function, which lends itself to a more
reactive and defensive role within an offensive situation.
The research model's focus on the customer and environment continued
to aid the identification of the contributing and required activities and events to
the various process requirements. The knowledge requirements and the
decision cycles within the AOC were the activities and events leading to the
tangible deliverables of the 10 Planners. The targeting cycle was determined to
be the correct model to emulate due to its strong presence within the AOC. It
governed all aspects of the environment and all members were deeply entwined
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within this process. In addition, each phase of the targeting cycle produced a
necessary output that could be the basis for further decomposition, aiding in the
decision making processes of the 10 planner in all phases of planning; long
range, deliberate, and crisis action.
The concept that offensive IW must be considered as a primary weapon
option, within the aerospace focused environment of the AOC, required that the
10 planner work within the processes of the given environment.

In addition,

"how" to integrate into the environment was also a basis of concern. These
concerns were solved by mapping the deliverables of the 10 planner to the
aerospace and targeting concepts, terms, and decision cycles already present
and in full use within the AOC. The overall process is presented in Chapter 4.
3.5

Stage III—Assessment of the Developed Process
Once a framework with the appropriate and applicable concepts and

definitions were developed, an initial assessment was essential. Two sets of
activities were used to assess the usefulness of the concepts derived and the
process developed. The first set of activities is referred to as the presentation
and is a briefing presenting the concepts and process to a group of participants.
It is accompanied with acquiring written individual feedback questionnaires from
each participant. A copy of the feedback questionnaire is included in Appendix
C. The group was made up of members from the Air Force Information Warfare
Center and ranged from senior level managers (group commander) to mid level
technicians.
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The second set of activities is referred to as the senior level review. This
activity included a personal review of a report outlining the background of the
current environment and the proposed concepts and process. The objective of
this activity was to attempt to determine, in the participants/reviewer's opinion,
the usefulness of the concepts and process to the 10 community. The
participants were chosen by their position and continued involvement with this
and other research efforts within the 10 community. Participants within this group
were creators, developers, and extensive users of 10 at the senior level. Review
questionnaires and interviews of the participants were used for this part of the
assessment.
Table 3- 3. Summary of Feedback Objectives

Presentation Critiques
Objectives: An initial assessment of
Usability and Usefulness

Senior Level Review Critiques
Objectives: An initial assessment of
Usefulness within the I0 community

Questions to answer:
1. Does the process seem useful?
2. Does the process seem easy to
use?
Questions to answer:
1. Do you approve or disapprove
with the process being useful to
the IO community?
2. Do you approve or disapprove
with each concept identified as
being useful to the IO
community?

A research summary also appears in Table 3- 4, under Stage III and the
assessment instruments are presented in Appendix C. The instruments include
briefing slides and feedback questionnaires for both activity levels.
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Research Extension: During the course of this research it became
apparent that there were several areas of knowledge required of an 10 planner.
One of these areas of knowledge; our own Offensive IW capabilities,
weaknesses, and limitations seemed to be non-existent in any consolidated form.
This knowledge is a critical and missing piece to Stage II—IW Weaponeering &
Force Application. In addition, this crucial knowledge area, which equates to
"know your self, could have implications in every aspect of offensive IW. If this
knowledge was used proactively and properly, it could drive long range planning,
weapon development and modification, a proactive and effective defensive
posture, and even better and more evasive target development.
This research extension of the process was also performed with a focus
on its applicability and understanding to further decompose the IW battlespace.
The goal was to use the concepts in Stage II to decompose the information
battlespace to a lower and more useable level than the effect point. This
extension included brainstorming sessions with groups of two to five participants
from a myriad of disciplines that included students of information security,
students at the 10 schoolhouse, researchers, and members of the AF Information
Warfare Center. The session stepped the group through a process of identifying
weapon or action characteristics (tactics, delivery platforms, and payloads) for
one of the attributes of the information battlespace. The end result was a list of
actions that would affect an attribute of the information environment in the
desired way. In addition, effects assessment indicators were also determined for
each action identified.
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Feedback regarding the usefulness of the process and concepts were
solicited upon completion of the brainstorming session from each participant. A
comment sheet or "After-Session" questionnaire form was used. The objective
of the feedback form was to determine if the process presented, was or would be
usable and useful to identifying types of offensive 10 actions in the opinion of the
participant.
3.6

Stage IV—Analysis of Findings
Analyzing the questionnaire from each activity; presentation and the

senior level reviews were focused on answering the questions presented in Table
3- 3. The assessment process consisted of the tabulation and analysis of the
presentation or senior level review feedback questionnaire by each participant.
The purpose of this part of the assessment stage was to determine if the
concepts and process appeared to be useful and usable.
The presentation questionnaire is broken down into three parts. Part 1 is
represented by two questions presented with a five-option response. This part is
used to determine the participant's opinion about the proposed process' usability
and usefulness. Part 2 and 3 are made up of one question each with identified
areas to indicate a positive response. In addition, written responses are
requested to further understand the opinion behind the answer.
The senior level review questionnaire is broken down into four parts. Part
1 is represented by 5, five-option response. The participants are asked for either
approval or disapproval on the process and other identified concepts in regards
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to its usefulness to the 10 community. Part 2 and 3 are made up of one question,
each with identified areas to indicate a positive response. In addition, each
question in Part 2 and 3 allows room for written responses. Part 4 were used to
solicit "General Comments". These questionnaires were sent out with the report,
but were not a requirement for a response.
3.7

Summary
The research conducted in this study included an initial assessment of the

10 environment, the development of a research model, grounded research
methods of data collection and comparative analysis, process development, and
subject matter expert assessments. In order to systematically progress, the
research was broken into five stages to allow for the decomposition and analysis
of the mission, environment, deliverables, and the applicable activities and
events. Stages 1-4 of the research process are summarized in Table 3- 4.
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Table 3- 4. Summary of Research—Stage I through Stage IV
Research Focus

Data Collection Type

Research Results—Deliverables,
Activities and Events

Stage 1—Determination of the External Environment
Determination of Environment and
Literature Review-Business
Customer Needs
Process Reengineering, Systems
Analysis, Process Identification,
Deliverables based on customer
needs
Determination of 10 planner
Literature Review-Joint and Air
decision requirements—
Force Doctrine, Operations
OPERATIONAL Level of
Concept, Training Plans and
Operations
Objectives (10 and AOC)
Field Observations-Blue Flag
Field Observations-IO Schoolhouse
Capstone
Attended-AOC training
Determination of 10 planner
Same as above
knowledge requirements—
OPERATIONAL Level of
Operations

Knowledge Requirements
-Battlefield Characteristics
-Adversary's Characteristics
-10 Weapon Capabilities

Determination of applicable
decision cycles within environment
of 10 planner— OPERATIONAL
Level of Operations

Same as above

Decision Cycles/Environment
-Targeting-Weaponeering Cycle
-Air Tasking Order Cycle
-Information Realm (Hierarchies)

Determination on how to integrate
definitions/concepts
Stage II—Process Development
Develop systematic process
Goal: Customer focused, useable,
and useful

Same as above

No single standardized process

Basis: Targeting Cycle with focus
on end product deliverables of the
ATO production cycle

Process
-Step-by-step method/process
-Common definitions/environment
-Input to feedback

Stage III—Validation of Process
Briefing/Presentation
Semi-Structured Briefing
Validate Developed Process
Participant: AF Information
Goal: Initial Face Validity
Warfare Center Personnel
Individual Session Feedback
Objective: Assess opinion upon
usefulness and usability of
concepts, definitions, and process
Senior Level
Validate Developed Process
Goal: Assess usefulness within 10
community

Stage IV—Analysis of Findings
Analyze Feedback

Report Review (Chapter 2)
Participant: Senior/Mid-Level
Managers involved in policy
formulation and implementation of
10 concepts
Review Critiques
Objective: Assess opinion upon
the usefulness within the 10
community
Five option response and Content
Analysis
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Environment
-NAF and JAOC
Customer Needs
-Attainment of objectives thru desired
effects thru affected targets
Decision Requirements/Deliverables
-Information Requirements
-Target Development
-Weaponeering
-Assessment Requirements

Briefing
-Background, concepts, definitions
-Process Breakdown
Critique Results
-Usability
-Usefulness
-Future Use
-Improvement Recommendations
Full Report Review
-Background, concepts, definitions
-Process Breakdown

Critique Results
-Usefulness within community

Identify usability and usefulness from
inputs from individuals

|

4
4.1

The Offensive IW Planning Process

Introduction
"In many respects, one can consider information as a realm, just as
land, sea, air, and space are realms. Information has its own
characteristics of motion, mass, and topography, just as air, space,
sea, and land have their own distinct characteristics."
"Land, sea, air, and space are realms within which we may conduct
military operations. Each realm imposes its characteristics on
operations within it. Information and its functions also may host
military operations, but those operations must conform to the
characteristics of the information system and its functions."
Cornerstones, 1995: 8
This chapter is a synopsis of findings of an exploratory and comparative

analysis conducted to understand and define the current IO environment at the
operational level of operations. The research is based upon the premise
identified by the above statements, that information is a realm, that it holds its
own characteristics that must conform to the characteristics of the information
systems and its functions (Cornerstones, 1995: 8). In order for the information
realm to take shape, this research identifies the IO mission, defines the offensive
IW mission, identifies its organizational structure and IO planner's deliverables,
and manpower. It then defines the goal of offensive IW, its target sets, its
decision environment, and its battlespace.
The final portion of this chapter is dedicated to giving these concepts and
definitions a framework by suggesting a useable and useful process, called the
Offensive IW Planning Process. This process will allow movement and
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integration of offensive IW as a primary weapon option into the activities of the
current and given environment of the Air Force.
4.2

The Mission of Air Force Offensive IW
The mission to integrate 10, as stated in the AF CONOPS, is a difficult

task that will require changes within the organizational structure, the mission, the
personnel, and the process. The tactical level is where the primary focus is to
deny, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise control an adversary's use of information (JP
3-13,1998:11-11). The operational level is where the theater planning of tactical
execution begins.
"AF IW efforts will focus on implementing IW capabilities through
warfighting component commands in support of joint warfighting commands"
(AFDD 2-5,1998: 7). In addition, IW activities and operations must be integrated
within the normal campaign planning and execution process, making its
consideration and use second nature (AFDD 2-5,1998: 7). It must become a
primary weapon system of consideration and use as a supported, and in
supporting, the achievement of strategy and objectives at all levels of operations.
The Air Force's current vision and mission for I0 is to establish and
maintain information superiority over the adversary and to provide the best
battlespace information to the right place—anywhere, anytime (AF CONOPS,
1999: iii). Offensive IW activities are conducted to control the information
environment in response to acquiring information superiority, therefore, enabling
the accomplishment of objectives (AF CONOPS, 1999:1). Coordination and
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synchronization of defensive and offensive actions are essential to incorporate
full spectrum 10 capabilities across the entire battlespace (AF CONOPS, 1999,
4). The I0 focus upon achieving Information Superiority is apparent and
explicitly identified within doctrine.
As in any organization, the mission and vision is the driving force and
directly contributes to the direction and focus of a unit. The I0 community is no
different. In order for offensive IW to become a primary weapon option, this
thesis postulates that offensive IW must refocus its mission upon achieving
another core competency; Precision Engagement. It must also achieve ...
"...the ability of forces to locate, surveil, discern, and track
objectives or targets, select, organize, and use the correct systems;
generate desired effects: assess results; and reengage with
decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required,
throughout the full range of military operations."
Joint Vision 2020, 2000: 28
Without this mission of achieving Precision engagement, offensive IW will
always remain as a supporting function to other weapon systems in achieving
information superiority.
4.3

The Organizational Structure, The Manpower, and The Deliverables
The organizational structure of IO at the operational level was set by the

incorporation of the IW flight embedment within selected MAJCOMs and
Numbered Air Forces (NAF) across the world. These flights are also the
specialty teams deployed as members of the Aerospace Operations Center
(AOC) (AF CONOPS, 1999: 11). The structure, purpose, and mission of the
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AOC are the driving force on how IW activities can be incorporated into the Air
Force as a primary weapon option. Incorporation into the AOC's major
processes is necessary.
The two major processes found within the AOC are the Air Tasking Order
(ATO) and targeting cycle processes. Both of these processes integrate
requirements, capabilities, and efforts of all command levels.
Figure 4-1 is re-introduced here in order to highlight the importance of the
targeting cycle and the major products of the ATO cycle.

Recommendations

Component Target
Nominations

Joint Integrated
Prioritized Target List
(JIPTL)

Execution Results

ATO Distribution

Master Air Attack Plan
(MAAP)

Summary of the Targe ting Cycle and Major ATO product deliverables
Source: 8AF Blue Flag Briefing Slidei. 2000

Figure 4-1. Targeting cycle and ATO product deliverables

Analyzing the major processes, the ATO and the targeting cycles helps to
identify the required IO planner inputs and deliverables into these planning
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cycles. Figure 4- 2, depicts the phases requiring 10 planner inputs, the specific
inputs, and deliverables into the planning cycles of the AOC into graphical form.
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Targets
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""^Veaponeeringy
Execution \ Indicators .•" \ Weapons i ÄBoCaüii
Force
Application

IO Deliverables
''-'l""'.l-> IO Inputs
Phases requiring IO planner input

Figure 4-2.10 Deliverables and Inputs

As a result of the analysis of the targeting and ATO cycle, the 10 planners
are directly responsible for three major products; target nominations, weapon
assignment, and assessment indicators. The first 10 product is target
nominations, which are the possible target elements that could be affected by an
offensive action. Targets that are eventually selected are included into the Joint
Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). The second product is weapon
assignment. In order to incorporate IW actions into the Master Air Attack Plan
(MAAP), IW weapons must be assigned to their appropriate targets. The third
major input by the 10 planner is assessment indicators. These indicators must
be fed into the intelligence collection requirements system in order to aid in the
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development of execution results upon completion of the force execution phase
and commencement of the combat assessment phase.
In short, the analysis of the AOC's organizational structure and processes
dictate timing and product requirements from all combat planners. As part of the
AOC, the 10 planners are directly responsible for the three major products that
identify IW related resources, which feed into the sub-processes within the ATO
and targeting cycles. These products are target nominations, weapon
assignment, and assessment indicators.
All planners within the AOC must combine intelligence about the
adversary (threat, target systems, target characteristics) with operations data on
resource capabilities (force posture, weapon systems and capabilities, weapon
effects, objectives, rules of engagement, and doctrine) in order to accomplish
proper targeting, application, and execution. (AFP 14-210, 1998: 7) IW Flight
members are the IO planners and focal point for planning and employing this
essential integration of adversary characteristics and friendly capability at the
AOC level.
As one reviews the function of the IW Flight in light of offensive IW, it
becomes apparent the flight is responsible for both deliberate and crisis action
planning. The differences between these two planning phases are 1) the
decision time factor and 2) frequency of the changing situation or environment.
Both deliberate and crisis action planning requires the IO planner to investigate
possible target sets and target effect points and attempt to match the adversary's
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vulnerabilities with possible IW capabilities to deny, disrupt, degrade or destroy
the adversary's use of information.
As the mission, organizational structure, and players within the equation to
operationalize offensive AF 10 are defined, the unknown variable, the process,
becomes an essential missing piece of the successful implementation of 10 into
the Air Force.
Before a process can be developed, several other and essential concepts
and definitions of the information environment must be identified. These
concepts and definitions must be defined in order to shape a realm in which
military operations can take place.
The next section of this chapter will outline a number of definitions and
concepts, in order to lay a foundation enabling the "how" to take place within the
current AF structure.
4.4

The Definitions, Concepts, and Foundation
As the AF 10 mission, organizational structure, its players, and their

deliverables are defined, the unknown variable, the process, becomes an
essential piece of the successful implementation of IO into the Air Force.
Before a process can be developed several other essential concepts and
definitions of the information environment must be identified. These concepts
and definitions must be defined in order to shape a realm in which military
operations can take place. This next section of this chapter will outline a number
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of definitions and concepts, in order to lay a foundation enabling the "how" to
take place within the current AF structure.
In the process of uncovering important variables, it has also identified
several important factors not explicitly or clearly outlined. These factors are
defined or clarified in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1. Summary of Definitions
Terms
Primary Offensive IW Goal
Tactical Level of Operations
Information, Information Systems,
Information Based Processes (13)
Decision Environment
IW Battlespace

Brief Definitions
Affecting the information factors of the
decisions of the adversary to achieve the
desired effect
Target sets that can be devalued and affect
quality of information
Information factors are inputs into decisions
which lead to an end result or effect
The environment where military IW
operations can take place. The basis of it
consist of 13 and effect points

Although the table lists the basic definitions of each of the terms used
within this research, the following section will define and clarify key factors that
will be needed to understand some of the reasons behind the process.
4.5

The Primary Offensive IW Objective and Target Set Determination
As mentioned in the previous section, offensive IW actions should focus

on the manipulation or destruction of information in order to support efforts to
affect the desired strategic, operational, and tactical objectives or effects.
Several US documents point to the human as the main target in IO. Joint
Vision (JV) 2020 states that the ultimate target of information operations is the
human decision maker (JV 2020, 2000: 36). The joint publication for Information
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Operations goes further stating; offensive 10 involves capabilities and activities to
affect adversary decision-makers and to achieve specific objectives (JP 3-13,
1998: viii). In addition, offensive IW can target three areas; human decision
processes (human factors), information and information systems used to support
decision making (links), and information and information systems used to
process information and implement decisions (nodes) (JP 3-13,1998:11-13). JV
2020 warns that it will be equally necessary to understand the complete realm of
Command and Control (C2) decision making, the nature of organizational
collaboration, and especially the "human in the loop" (JV 2020, 2000: 38).
If the mission and focus of IO is on the end result, one can work
backwards to the decision maker and find the most important area acting upon
the end results is the decisions made by the decision maker. Although
attempting to understand the decision-maker and his or her decision-making
process is an important variable, the real concerns are the decisions that result in
effects. In addition, focusing on the decision maker and his or her decisionmaking process narrows the actions that can affect the decision maker without
regard for other very important and potentially more accessible targets.
At the operational and tactical level of war, understanding the decisionmaker and his or her decision making process is a difficult task. JP 3-13 states
that, "the primary focus of offensive IO at this level is to deny, disrupt, destroy, or
otherwise control an adversary's use of information and information systems" (JP
3-13,1998:11-11). The difference between focusing on the decision versus the
decision maker can be academic, but a difference can exist if at the operational
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level the 10 planner lacks sufficient intelligence data to extrapolate to what can
and does affect the decisions and the overall effect. The danger is if the target
is the decision-maker and/or his decision making process, the tendency to forget
the true desired effect and it's associated decision is easily manifested.
This thesis assumes that the overall offensive IW goal is to affect the
information factors of the desired decisions of the adversary in order to achieve
the desired effects within the area of interest. With this objective several target
sets become available. These target sets are the information realm, the
decision-maker, and the decision-makers decision-making process. It is
important to note that there are two opportunities to affect the information realm.
The first is the information realm that makes up the inputs into the decision
maker and decision making process. The second realm disseminates the
outputs (decisions) of the decision maker and decision making process back into
the organization. All of these target sets have one thing in common; all are
affected by the quality of its information, information systems, and information
based processes.
Figure 4- 3 illustrates the possible target sets that affect the desired effect.
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Movement towards the Decision & Effect
IW Strategy—Induce Desired Decisions or the Dissemination of the Decisions
to Achieve Desired Effects

Figure 4- 3. 10 Target Sets

Although the distinctions between the target sets of the information realm
and the decision maker and the decision making process may seem
inconsequential at first glance, they do provide for different offensive actions and
tangible assessment measures. For these reasons, the suggested process
focuses on affecting the information realm, which defines the target set, the
components, and attributes of the environment.
4.6

Determination of the IW Battles pace
The determination of the IW Battlespace is built around a decision

environment concept presented in this next section. The basis of this concept is
that the decision is affected by the quality of information or information factors
required, presented, and accepted by the different levels of decision-makers.
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Therefore, it is the objective of offensive IW, at the tactical level of
operations, to affect or devalue the quality of information or information factors
received from the processes and systems used by the adversary as inputs into
the decision or as the decisions are disseminated back out into the organization.
Figure 4- 4 illustrates the decision environment of an adversary.

Decision Environment

Information Factors

* Desired Decision

*" Information Factors

*■ Desired Effect

Figure 4- 4. Decision Environment

In order to affect the information factors of the decision environment is
through the Information Realm target set. The only widely accepted doctrine and
guidance of the information realm is to the component level of Information,
Information Systems, and Information Based Processes (13) (JP 3-13,1998: vii).
For the purpose of presenting offensive IW as a primary weapon option, this
breakdown of the information realm must be further decomposed.
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The decomposition used as the basis for defining the IW battlespace is a
model developed by Capt Michael P. Doyle to represent the information realm
called the Value Hierarchy for the Information Realm. It also incorporates a costs
hierarchy. The models are based on value-focused thinking, a decision analysis
approach. It is the representation of value attributes of the information realm that
is complete, nonredundant, understandable, and operational. (Doyle, 1998: 3-9)
As offensive IW objectives are applied to devalue the quality of the information
received by the decision-maker, the model transforms into an Objectives
Hierarchy for Offensive IO and cost objectives (Doyle, 1998: 3-10). These
hierarchies were referenced in Chapter 2.
Capt Doyle's models depict the Information Realm to a level where
information can now be affected. The IO planner can now focus in on the
adversary's effect points that will affect the information received and required to
make a decision. The decomposition presented within this realm; Information,
Information Systems, and Information Based Processes and its associated
attributes are suitable as the basis for target set and effect point identification and
the beginning of the formation of an IW Battlespace.
Several modifications have been incorporated in order to simplify some of
the original terms presented in Capt Doyle's study.

In addition, the original

models were not developed to be used as proposed here; therefore, some
modifications were required to align the model with the purpose of this process.
Asterisks are used to signify a significant change to the original model.

Simple

rewording does not signify a change to the model, just a clarification and are not
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identified. The proposed IW Battlespace that includes the 13 target set and effect
points are illustrated in Figure 4- 5.

IW Battlespace
Attack Information Realm
Information. IntoniwHon Sjntwn, Iran nwlion BMWI PTOCMMS

Attack Information

Attack Information Systems

Increase Info Needed for Awareness

Reduce Bandwidth
S

Devalue/Increase Age of Information

Reduce Throughput

Reduce Bdetty of Information

Reduce Rdetty of System

...Target Sets
Attack Information Based Processes
Attack Efficiency

Increase Consumption of Essential Resources
13
Increase Consumption of Essential Time
14
I

Increase Error Content of Message

1

3"

j

Decrease Completeness of Message
4'

Increase Error Content of Message

Decrease Completeness of Message
8

Attack Effectiveness

Reduce Timeliness of Process
15

Defeat Security
Reduce Accuracy of Process
16
M

Increase Recovery Rate of System
9

Reduce Focus on Process
17

Defeat Overall Security of System

Reduce Resilience of Process
18

Defeat Physical Hardness
10
I Defeat Security Measures and Processes
!
11

...Effect Points

Defeat Detection System
12-

Figure 4- 5. Proposed IW Battlespace—Target Sets and Effect Points

In order to complete the information realm, the costs objectives identified
by Capt Doyle are also included (Doyle, 1998) and illustrated in Figure 4- 6.
When attempting to minimize cost brought about by target selection and
weaponeering, all aspects described here should be considered. In addition, a
financial cost may also be imposed upon the decision.
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Information Realm
Offensive IW C ost O bjectives
Minimize Cost
Minimize Friendly
Personnel at Risk

Maintain Sensitive
Information Security

Consider the relative risk of injury or death

Consider cost and probability of losing system

Maximize Weapon
System Survivability

Minimize Collateral
Damage

Consider exposure or use by adversary of sensitive
Inform atiorVmethodsAechnology

Consider costs and effects of colateral damage

Figure 4- 6. Offensive IW Cost Objectives

Another important piece of Capt Doyle's Value Focused Thinking models
of offensive 10 objectives and cost are the associated measures of effectiveness
identified for each value and cost attribute (Doyle, 1998). These associated
measures of effectiveness are summarized in Table 4- 2, with the appropriate
modifications. All of the models are used within the proposed process as a
means of identifying possible offensive actions and their appropriate effects
assessment indicators (EAIs).
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Table 4- 2. Measures of Effectiveness of Attributes and Costs

1

2
3*
4*
5

Defined
Objective

Offensive Action*

[Measurement
Unit

Measurement
Type

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Increase amount of
Information needed for
awareness
Increase Age of Information

Manipulate & destroy information
needed

Level of support required to
maintain awareness level

Category

User-level

Maintenance Level

Manipulate & destroy updates

Number of change cycles since
update
Relative amount of meaning
retained
Percentage of Error Content

Increase Error Content of
Message
Decrease Completeness of
Message
Reduce Bandwidth

6

Reduce Throughput

7

9

Increase Error Content
Imposed by System
Decrease Completeness of
Message Imposed by System
Increase Recovery Time

10

Penetrate Physical System

11

Defeat Security Measures
and Processes
Defeat Detection System

8

ir
13

16

Increase Consumption of
Essential Resources
Increase Consumption of
Essential Time
Reduce Timeliness of
Process
Reduce Accuracy of Process

17

Reduce Focus on Process

18

Reduce Resilience of
Process
Minimize Risk to Friendly
Personnel
Minimize Sensitive
Information Security
Minimize Weapon System
SurvivaMity
Mnimize Collateral Damage

14
15

C1
C2
C3
C4

Manipulate & destroy content of
message
Manipulate & destroy completeness of
message
Manipulate & destroy available
bandwidth
Manipulate & destroy available
throughput
Manipulate & destroy content of
message corrected by system
Manipulate A destroy completeness of
message corrected by system
Manipulate & destroy recovery time of
system
Manipulate & destroy physical hardness
of system
Manipulate & destroy measures and
processes
Manipulate & destroy detection system
Manipulate & destroy essential
resources
Manipulate & destroy essential time
required
Manipulate & destroy change cydes
Manipulate & destroy accuracy of
process
Manipulate & destroy focus of process
Manipulate & destroy adaptability and
recovery of process

I

Relative Level of Bandwidth
available
Relative Level of Throughput
available
Percentage of Error Content
Relative amount of meaning
retained
Change Cycles over which the
System is unable to perform
Level of Defeat effected
Likelihood of gaining access to
system
Expected Abilty to Defeat
Adversary's Intrusion Detection
Percentage of Essential
Resources Consumed
Percentage of Essential Time
Consumed
Number of change cycles that the
processed product is late
Percentage of Degradation to
Process'Accuracy
Expected Ability to Redirect
Process
Expected AbiHy to Reduce
Process Adaptability and Recovery
Relative Level of Risk

Quantity

0

5

Category

No Change

Percentage

0

No Meaning
Retained
100

Category

No Change

Deny Flow

Category

No Change

Stop Flow

Percentage

0

100

Category

No Change

Quantity

0

No Meaning
Retained
5

Category

No Capability

Probablity

No Change

Completely
Defeated
High Probablity

Category
Percentage

Certainty of
Desired Effect
0

Low Likelihood of
Desired Effect
100

Percentage

0

100

Quantity

0

3

Percentage

0

100

Category

No Change

Category

No Change

Completely
Redirected
Complete Failure

Percentage

0

100
100

Expected Level of Proliferation

Percentage

0

Expected Probability of Survival

Probablity

0

1

Expected Level of Collateral
Damage

Percentage

0

100

Source: Capt Michael P. Doyle, AFIT Thesis, 1998.

Affecting the information factors within the decision environment of the
adversary is the basis for using the information realm as the starting point for the
formation of the IW Battlespace. The further decomposition suggested by Capt
Doyle solidifies the use of the information realm and the associated attributes
and costs as the right environment.
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4.7

The IW Planning Process
In addition, to the overall goal of offensive IW and working within the given

organizational structure of the AOC forces the requirement to work within the
targeting and ATO cycles. The proposed process incorporates the two cycles
and aids in the delivery of the required products and inputs as outlined earlier.
The suggested process is an attempt to set a standardized framework for
use within the AF IW community in respect to offensive actions. Its purpose is to
offer the commander a baseline capability of an AF 10 planner without regard to
experience and personality. The process also offers assurance of a
standardized "all options explored" analysis of the information battlespace.
The process was developed with regard to the organizational structure
and process cycles within the AOC and with the AF IW Flight members as its
user. It is well understood that specific operational details, when employing
offensive IW capabilities, will be dictated by theatre specific characteristics and
situational circumstances.
The intent of this proposed process is to use the process in both phases of
planning; deliberate and crisis action.
The suggested process rebundles the steps of the targeting cycle affected
and controlled by the 10 planner and forces him or her to focus on producing
products tied to the major milestones and deliverables required within these
planning cycles. The process is made up of four phases; Effects Based Target
Development, IW Weaponeering and Force Application, Force Execution, and IW
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Combat-Assessment Analysis. Figure 4- 7, illustrates the four areas the process
covers and the desired end products or deliverables. This process has been
reviewed at each of its phases of development by a number of IO/IW experts.
Their comments and inputs have been used to refine the process.

Effects Based Target Development

IW Weaponeering & Force Application

IW Combat-Assessment Analysis

Figure 4- 7. The Suggested Process—Operational Level of Operations

The next section of this chapter will discuss the different phases of the
proposed process. It attempts to present a simple, systematic, and
comprehensive process that would eventually become second nature to all 10
planners at the operational level of operations.
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4.7.1 The Effects Based Target Development Phase
The effects based target development phase combines the first two steps
of the targeting cycle; Objectives/Guidance and Target Development with the IW
deliverables of aimpoints (target nominations) and the desired effects.

Effects Based Target Development
DDC

Strategy/Objectives
•Higher
Organizational
ODC

o

Effects-Based Operations

o

• Desired effects in support of
strategies and objectives

Target Set Consideration
• How can you affect the
Decision thru 13

Aimpoint Identification
• Analyze Aimpoint Effects
•ID Intel Needed

Aimpoints and Desired Effects

Weaponeering & Force Application
Force Execution
IW Combat-Assessment Analysis

Figure 4- 8. Phase I—Effects Based Target Development

In this phase, all steps should be performed at all levels of operations;
strategic, operational, and tactical without regard to the weapon system to be
used. The objective is to determine the desired decision and the desired effect
upon the adversary and determine the target set and effect point that will result in
the desired effect.
As an IW focus is applied to this phase, the underlying assumptions, as
presented earlier are summarized below.
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1.

The objective of offensive IW is to affect the information in order to
induce a desired decision, therefore achieving the desired effect.

2.

Decisions are affected by the quality of information factors received,
accepted, and disseminated by the adversary.

3.

Target sets are associated with the information realm components of
information, information based processes, and information systems.

4.

Target effect points are associated with the information realm value
attributes.

With the information realm representing the IO planner's battlespace or
environment of operations, planners should identify the possible effects to these
target sets that may support the stated strategy and objectives.
Once it is determined which component of the IW Battlespace can
possibly be attacked to accomplish the desired effect, then effect point
identification analysis would commence. Initially, the process is performed to
identify single actions (non-synergistic combinations) with the reasoning of trying
to understand the effects for each attribute when attacked by a certain weapon
capability. This helps to better identify simple solutions and lead to only those
actions needing to be combined in an attempt to get a synergistic effect.
The recommended sequence of analysis is to identify all components of 13
that would lend itself to being attacked, resulting with the desired decision and
effect. Once the components were identified, possible effect points would then
be analyzed. This is done by isolating each value attribute within the appropriate
component and determining if affecting or devaluing the attribute would/could has
the desired effect upon the decision.

4-20

After identifying all the possible attributes that could have the desired
effect upon the information realm, the next step would be to apply an initial
feasibility assessment. If performed within the deliberate planning phase, this
could identify possible intelligence requirements gaps needed to affect this
specific attribute and further identify specific aimpoints available. In addition,
new or modified weapon capability requirements for the theatre could also be
identified.
The following are some of the possible questions a feasibility assessment
might wish to answer. The purpose of the assessment is to identify the shortfalls
as well as eliminate the obvious, unfeasible aimpoints.
Weapon Characteristic Requirements:
1. How persistent does the weapon have to be to accomplish the desired
effect?
2. How precise does the weapon have to be to accomplish the desired
effect?
3. Do we have the required capability?
4. Can we modify a current weapon or obtain the capability?
Information/Intelligence Requirements:
1. What type of information/intelligence is needed to ensure the desired
effect?
2. What type of information/intelligence is needed to ensure its precision?
3. Can we acquire the needed information?
Risk Management Assessment Requirements:
1. How complex is the action of attacking this particular aimpoint?
2. What's the probability of success/failure?
3. What's the impact if the attack fails?
4. Does the impact (criticality/cost) of failure outweigh the possible
benefits of the action?

Although this phase can be tedious, it is critical. It also sets the stage for
the rest of the process. Through the use of the IW Battlespace, identifying
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possible effect points and then the specific target and its aimpoint to achieve the
desired effects, allows the planner to analyze the weaponeering phase better and
helps in identifying possible, probable, and observable indicators of action
success or failure.
Before moving forward, a word of caution is necessary. It is necessary to
avoid the temptation to jump to a solution before applying all offensive IW
capabilities to each attribute, especially during deliberate planning.
Systematically going through this phase can help to identify any shortfalls in
intelligence and capabilities, and potentially identifying possibilities normally not
considered.
The desired effect and selected IW target aimpoints are then passed to
the next phase; IW Weaponeering and Force Application.
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4.7.2 IW Weaponeering and Force Application Phase

Effects Based Target Development

Level of Effect
• Manipulate & Destroy

Weapon Characteristics
* Weapon System
"Delivery Method ind Platform
•Paylojd

[k

<0
Parameters to Consider

Measures of Effectiveness

-T202C

Effects Assessment Indicators
• Triggers/Flags/Activities to watch to assess
«■■"•■"« " failure

■ Attack upon Effect point

A

Figure 4- 9. Phase II—IW Weaponeering & Force Application

The IW Weaponeering & Force Application phase matches weapon
resources and capabilities to target vulnerabilities in order to achieve the desired
level of effect. Analyzing each effect point and selected aimpoint, one weapon at
a time, helps to focus on determining which possible capabilities are available
and in identifying synergistic combinations later in the process. The two steps
within this phase are broken down into areas needing consideration or decisions.
The first step is identifying weapon characteristics of the chosen weapon system.
Some of the weapon characteristics have already been identified in the previous
phase and need to be incorporated here.
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To be able to identify the weapon resource that could possibly be used,
there are elements of a weapon system that must be considered. These
elements can be categorized into three areas; weapon system, delivery
characteristics, and payload. These categories are aligned closely with normal
weaponeering concepts, but are presented here with an IW focus. In addition,
Table 4- 3 defines several terms as used within this research and suggested
process.
1. Weapon System
What is the specific product or action?
a. The specific offensive IW pillar—PSYOPS, deception, physical
attack, electronic warfare, and information attack.
2. Delivery Characteristics
This is made up of two sub-categories
a. Delivery Methods
How are we going to perform the action?
1. Attributes or Aimpoints
2. Level of Effect
i. Manipulate (Deny, Degrade, Disrupt)
ii. Destroy
3. Parameters to Consider (T2Q2C)
i. Timing
When and for how long do you need the action to take
place or the weapon to perform?
ii. Time
Is it time sensitive? Does it have to occur in a certain
order or at a specific time?
iii. Quality
What degree of precision is needed from the weapon?
Consider levels of effect as well as inherent weapon
capabilities and characteristics.
iv. Quantity
What degree of persistence is needed from the weapon?
Consider aimpoint characteristics as well as desired
effects.
v. Cost Attributes
What will be the associated costs (cost objectives
introduced earlier) of deploying this weapon?
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b. Platform
With what are we going to do this action? What will transport
the "effect" to the target?
i. Equipment
ii. Manpower
3. Payload or Munitions Characteristics
What will create the desired and appropriate effect? What is required
to give us the effect we are seeking?
Table 4- 3. IW Weaponeering & Force Application Terms
Terms
Method

Platform
Payload
Levels of Effect
Parameters to Consider
Effects Assessment Indicators

Definitions
This covers "how" the system will be used.
This would include the attribute selected,
level of effect and the appropriate and
applicable parameters to consider
The equipment, system, or person used to
transport the product or action to the
intended target
The active agent or effect mechanism
Manipulate and destroy dimensions
(Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, and Destroy)
Timing, Time, Quality, Quantity, & Costs
(T2Q2C)
Flags, triggers, or events identified to help
assessment efforts in observing and
analyzing the success or failure of the
offensive action in regards to the desired
effects

The IW targeteer identifies delivery method and payload characteristics to
the level of detail required to employ the action or weapon. Situation and theatre
specific circumstances will drive the level of effect and parameters to consider.
This is where the "human in the loop" is very important, incorporating the
nuances of the current environment into the process. In addition, weapon and
target packaging must be further coordinated to ensure the tasking is still
appropriate and possible due to any resource or weapon redirection.
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The second step in this phase is to identify effects assessment indicators
(EAIs). EAIs are flags, triggers, or events of a mission, weapon, or method that
can be "watched" for success or failure in obtaining the desired decision and
effect. These indicators are based on analyzing the theatre situation, appropriate
measures of effectiveness, weapon characteristics, and desired effects.
The weaponeered targets and EAIs are forwarded to the IW Flight's
combat operations and IIW personnel for incorporation into current operations
and intelligence collection and used in the next phases of the process.
4.7.3 The Force Execution Phase
The Force Execution Phase is when the actual execution of the mission or
employment of the weapon occurs. In addition, any redirection and deconfliction
of target selection occurs in this phase.

An important aspect of this phase is the

retargeting and time sensitive targeting opportunities. IO planners are required
to have situational awareness and operational knowledge of the current
battlespace. This requires inputs from both phase I and II. In order to turn
situational awareness into battlespace knowledge and ultimately an appropriate
decision, the 10 planner will need more knowledge then weaponeered targets
and the appropriate EAIs. He or she will have to know "why" these targets were
selected and the desired decisions and effects. This type of comprehensive
knowledge about what is wanted and what should happen would assist the 10
planner in making critical and timely real-time targeting changes if indicators are
prematurely observed.
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The deliverables, affected targets and assessment information, although
not controlled by the 10 planner within the AOC, are passed to the next phase of
the process. These deliverables are gathered and analyzed in the next phase.
4.7.4 The IW Combat-Assessment Analysis Phase

Effects Based Target Development

IW Weaponeering & Force Application

Force Execution

IW Combat-Assessment Analysis
Assessment Analysis

Effects of Weapon
Weapon Specific

|^

Weapon • Mission • Method

3E
Effects on Mission

Effects of Method
Method Specific

Mission Specific

Figure 4-10. Phase IV—IW Combat-Assessment Analysis

The IW Combat-Assessment Analysis is the essential feedback
mechanism to identify success or failure of the different aspects of offensive and
defensive effectiveness. In parallel with conventional combat assessment, IW
offensive assessment is broken down into several different areas of concern.
Figure 4-10 illustrates the components of this phase.
Three types of analysis are proposed for the tactical level of operations of
IW.
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1. Weapon Specific
This is the effectiveness of the weapon or action's effect to the
intended information component and aimpoint.
Did the action/weapon perform as expected?
2. Method Specific
This is the effectiveness of the tactics, platform, and payload of the
weapon chosen.
Did the method, platform, and payload chosen perform as expected?
3. Mission Specific
This is the effectiveness of the action's effect on the decision made.
Did the action/weapon result in the desired effect?

The output to this phase is the effectiveness analysis, which is fed back
into the targeting and ATO cycles. This feedback aids in the adjustments
required to ensure effects based operations and planning in meeting the stated
strategy and objectives. Table 4- 4 summarizes the general steps an IO planner
must accomplish within each phase of the process.
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Table 4- 4. Summary of IW Planning Process Steps
Phase 1—Effects Based Target Development

A process of target aimpoint selection that focuses
on the effect or result an action may produce
Input:
Strategy and Objectives
Phase 1 Steps
Outputs: Desired Effect &
Identify Desired Effect
Aimpoints
Identify Desired Decision of the Adversary
Identify the 13 Component to be attacked
Identify the attributes within each component to be
attacked
Phase II—IW Weaponeering & Force Application Determining and matching the appropriate types of
IW weapon capabilities to the specific target and
aimpoint
Inputs: Desired Effect &
Phase II Steps
Aimpoints
Identify weapon system that could be used for
Outputs: Weaponeered Targets & EAIs
each selected aimpoint
Identify the delivery method, platform, & payload
Note: More comprehensive feasibility analysis
Identify the Level of Effect possible
should be conducted during the deliberate
Identify the T2Q2C characteristics
planning phase.
Conduct a feasibility analysis for each weapon
possibility
Phase Ill-Force Execution
The actual execution of the mission or employment
of the weapon. Any redirection and deconfliction of
target selection also occurs.
Inputs: Weaponeered Targets & EAIs
Phase III Steps
Outputs: Affected Targets & Effects
Observe current operations
Identify any pre-mature EAIs
Note: Planners must also understand the
Identify time-sensitive targeting requirements
strategy, objectives, desired effects, and desired
decisions that represent each target or target
package and the associated EAIs.
Phase IV—IW Combat-Assessment Analysis
Post strike data assessment analysis based on
effects assessment indicators. Three levels of
assessment; decision, weapon, and method should
be accomplished.
Inputs: Affected Targets & Collection
Phase IV Steps
Results
Observe operations for EAIs
Outputs: Effectiveness Analysis
Assess Decision effects
Assess Weapon effectiveness
Note: Planners must also understand the
Assess Method effectiveness
strategy, objectives, desired effects, and desired
decisions that represent each target or target
package and the associated EAIs.
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4.8

Conclusion
The concepts, definitions, and process presented are developed to

suggest one possible way of working within the current and given Air Force
environment and implementing IW as a supported and primary weapon choice. It
attempts to focus on the commonalties found across theatres and the information
community. The concepts are based upon assumptions, interpretations, and
conclusions drawn from the doctrine and policy guiding the operationalization of
10.
Its basis is a result of a recombination of old and new in order to
operationalize IW capabilities. The first part of this chapter, postulates three new
concepts in order to position and shape a realm where IW-related military
operations can take place. The first concept is a new offensive mission of
achieving Precision Engagement. The second concept is the primary offensive
IW goal of affecting the information factors of the adversary's decisions to
achieve the desired effect. The third concept is a common view of the IW
battlespace of 13 target sets and effect points.
The second part of this chapter suggest a process that is a systematic
way to focus on the necessary deliverables in all planning phases within the AOC
and also aides in the further decomposition of the battlespace in regards to lower
level targets and specific aimpoints. If these concepts are accepted in its
entirety, it should aid the 10 planners as they strive to position IW capabilities as
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a supported primary weapon choice, as well as, a supporting function to the
kinetic and traditional forms of warfare.
Chapter 5 presents an assessment of the suggested 10 Planning process
by both operational level and senior level personnel within the 10 community.
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5
5.1

Assessment Analysis

The Assessments
Two sets of activities were used to assess the possible usefulness and

usability of the concepts derived and the process developed in this research.
The first activity is termed the Presentation Assessment. The objective of this
activity was to assess the usefulness and usability of the suggested process
across a wide range of qualified participants. The second activity was called the
Senior Level Assessment. The objective of this activity was focused on obtaining
an initial assessment of the usefulness of the different concepts and process to
the IO community. Due to the relatively small sample sizes, statistical analysis
was not conducted. The data is provided in tabular form.
5.1.1 The Presentation Assessment
The presentation assessment activity was conducted at the Air Force
Information Warfare Center and included 25 participants. Two briefings were
given to include background material, definitions of concepts, and the suggested
process, which is shown in Chapter 4. Feedback questionnaires were handed
out at the end of the presentations and participants were requested to voluntarily
complete them. The participant's ranged in rank from Technical Sergeant to
Colonel. Their level of experience ranged from a new recruit into IO, to extensive
targeteering and command and control warfare involvement, to a group
commander of the IO group at Kelly AFB.
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Of the 25 participants, 17 feedback questionnaires were returned. Of the
eight participants that did not respond, only three chose not to fill out the
questionnaire. The other five left during the briefing due to prior engagements
and were not asked to fill out a feedback questionnaire. This resulted in a
response rate of 17 of 20 or 85%. A copy of the questionnaire is provided in
Appendix C.
Results—Presentation. The feedback questionnaire was divided into
three separate parts. The objective of Part 1 was to assess if the suggested
process appeared to be easy to use and/or useful. The actual responses are
summarized in Table 5-1. A graphical representation is presented in Figure 5-1.
Table 5-1. Presentation Survey Part 1—Summary of Responses

Presentation
Parti
1 Easy to use
% of Response
2 Useful
% of Response

14

Strongly
Disagree
0
0%
0
0%

Disagree
0
0%
1
6%

No
Opinion
3
18%
0
0%

ll^iSPPlP*

12

Agree
14
82%
10
59%

Strongly
Agree
0
0%
6
35%

::>rt&äfc&löjfe

10-1
I Easy to Use
I Useful

6!

Strongly Disagree
Disagree

No
Opinion

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Figure 5-1. Presentation Survey Part 1—Graphical View of Responses
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Part 1 Analysis: The analysis is divide into two possible parts; the
respondent's belief that the process was easy to use and usefulness. Fourteen
of the 17 respondents believed the process were easy to use, leading to an 82%
"belief rate. In regards to the process' usefulness, 16 of the 17 respondents
believed that the process was useful by marking agreed or strongly agreed for a
94% "belief rate. Both of these areas seem to support a strong belief that the
process is easy to use and useful.
Part 2: The objective of Part 2 was twofold. First, part 2 served as a
second check on the process assessment for usefulness. Second, it was used to
identify any unusual issues in each of the aspects presented in the briefing.
These aspects were broken down into three areas; process, definitions, and
information environment. As mentioned above, question 2a was included to
check if there was a supporting relationship between part 1 and part 2 of the
feedback questionnaire in regards to the usefulness of the process. The
respondent's results are summarized below in Table 5- 2.
Table 5- 2 Presentation Survey Part 2—Summary of Responses

Presentation—Part 2
Question
a. Process
b. Definitions
c. Information Environment

Number of
Responses
9
7
9

% of
Responses of 11
82%
64%
82%

%of
Responses of 17
53%
41%
53%

Part 2 Analysis. There seem to be a positive relationship between Part 1,
and Part 2 of the feedback questionnaire in regards to the usefulness of the
process. Eleven participants responded in Part 2 of the questionnaire. Nine of
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the sixteen participants that agreed or strongly agreed in Part 1 (to identifying
that they believed the process seem to be useful in identifying possible actions to
be taken) also indicated that they would use the suggested process in the future.
Three participants gave no responses in Part 2, two did not circle "process" and
did circle another aspect, and two made notes in Part 2, but did not circle the
area as instructed. The positive relationship between Part 1 and Part 2, serves
as a good indicator that respondents (9 of the original 17) consistently believed
the process would be useful in the future.
The second objective of Part 2 was also positive. The participants that
responded seem to feel that the other aspects, definitions and the information
environment, would be of use to them in the future.
Part 3: The objective of Part 3 was to check if any contradictions could be
observed in the first two parts of the survey.
Part 3 Analysis: Only one participant chose to circle one aspect, but also
noted that it "is important, but lesser of the other two (selections given).
Therefore, there seem to be no contradictions.
Summary of Results—Presentation. The respondents provided positive
and strong support to this initial assessment of the process' being easy to use
and its usefulness. The definitions and information environment presented were
also believed to be of use to the respondents. Although, three participants
chose not to complete the feedback questionnaire, there was no negative
feedback from the participants that did respond.
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5.1.2 Senior Level Assessment
The senior level assessment activity consisted of a request to review and
comment on a report outlining the background, the concepts, and the developed
process. The report was sent over e-mail and responses were through the use
of the furnished feedback questionnaires or a personal interview.
questionnaires were distributed, but its use was not mandatory.

Feedback
Responses

were accepted in any format. Table 5- 3 summarizes the list of reviewers
requested to participate in the review. The reviewers were selected for their
experience and their direct exposure to on-going IO research efforts and the
development and growth of the IO community.
Table 5- 3. List of Senior Level Reviewers
Organization
JIOC
HQAIA
AFRL
AFRL
AFRL
AFRL
67IOG
8
39 IPS (School house)
39 IPS (School house)
10 39 IPS (School house)
12 23 IPS
13 PACAF IW Flight
14 12AF/IW Flight
15 7AF/IW Flight

Responsibility or Career
J-3 Joint IO Planner
J-3 Technical Director
IO Project Mgr
Retired Vice IO Group CC
IO Experiment Developer
C2 Analyst
Commander
Director of Pperations
Targeeter
IO Intel Analyst
Commander/Intelligence Officer
IO Planner/Superintendent
Director of Operations
IO Planner

Responded
unable-TDY
.yes.
.yes.

yes
yes

yes
no

yes
yes
yes
no
yes
unable-TDY
unable-Leave

*The feedback questionnaire received from the PACAF IW representative was an effort of three
IW Flight members. Each member reviewed the report and one feedback form was returned
representing a consolidation of their inputs.
Results—Senior Level Review. The objective of this assessment activity
was to obtain an initial overall assessment of the usefulness of the concepts and
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suggested process across a variety of 10 experts within the community. The
feedback questionnaire used for this activity was divided into four parts.
Part 1: The objective of Part 1 of the questionnaire was to obtain an
opinion regarding the approval or disapproval of the suggested process and
other important concepts presented in the research report, The concepts were
broken down into five areas; the process, I0 as a primary weapon system, the
goal of affecting the information factors, the IW battlespace, and the concept of
effects assessment indicators. This activity received a 60% (9 of 15) response
rate.
Table 5- 4 presents a summary of the responses for Part 1. Figure 5- 2 is
a graphical representation of the responses. The nine respondents, while a
small sample, do represent a highly qualified group of senior IO personnel in the
US Air Force.
Table 5- 4. Senior Level Survey Part 1—Summary of Responses

Senior Level
Parti
1. Process
% of Responses
2. Primary Weapon
% of Responses
3. Goal-Info Factors
% of Responses
4. IW Battlespace
% of Responses
5. EAIs
% of Responses

Strongly
Disapprove
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%

Disappro
ve
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
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No
Opinion
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
1
11%

Approve
3
33%
4
44%
4
44%
7
78%
6
67%

Strongly
Approve
6
67%
5
55%
5
55%
2
22%
2
22%

|

fi.l
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4
2

1

iSiiiiiii
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Strongly
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B Process
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Figure 5- 2. Senior Level Survey Part 1—Graphical View of Responses

Part 1 Analysis: All respondents either approved or strongly approved in
all but one of the aspects presented. One respondent expressed "no opinion" in
one aspect; Effects Assessment Indicator.
Part 2: The objective of Part 2 was to obtain an initial assessment in
regards to the usefulness to the IO community of the different aspects presented
in the research. In addition, this part of the questionnaire would also identify any
issues or suggestions for improvements. Seven of the nine participants
responded. A summary of responses is included in Table 5- 5.
Table 5- 5. Senior Level Survey Part 2—Summary of Responses
Senior Level—Part 2
Question
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Process
IW as Primary Weapon
Goal: Info Factors
IW Battlespace
Effects Indicators

Number of
Responses
5
4
5
6
6

%of
Responses of 7
71%
57%
71%
86%
86%
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%of
Responses of 9
55%
44%
55%
67%
67%

Part 2 Analysis: Seven of the nine respondents used part 2 to explicitly
identify those aspects they thought would be useful to the 10 community. Three
respondents made extensive remarks in this part. The majority of the remarks
were comments regarding real world circumstances and hardships being faced
by 10 planners in the field.
Part 3: The objective of part 3 of this questionnaire was to see if any
contradictions to prior responses could be found. In addition, this part of the
questionnaire would also identify any issues the participants may have with the
different aspects of the research.
Part 3 Analysis: Only one participant chose to circle one aspect, but also
noted that it "it was least useful, but not non-useful". Therefore, there seem to be
no contradictions to previous responses in other parts of the questionnaire.
Part 4: This part was a catch all category of "General Comments". It
allowed the respondents to respond freely to anything and everything presented
in the research report.
Part 4 Analysis: Overall use of this part of the questionnaire was very
good. All but one respondent wrote a narrative to compliment their inputs. Most
comments focused on the 10 environment in general and suggestions to the
clarify points made in the report. There was one common theme that was easily
identified from four of seven narratives. The respondents believed that the report
was a great start of focused research needed in the 10 community. Several
quotes are included below to support this conclusion.
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"This effort is superb in that it unfolds the path to the above goal."
Vice Commander, 67 IOG, Retired
"...no-nonsense approach to offensive IW offers a blueprint for
future efforts to systematically exploit the information realm to our
advantage."
AFRL 10 Experiment Developer
"This type of focused research is precisely what's needed for the 10
community (and Air Force) to succeed."
PACAF IWF
"AFRL is seriously looking at leveraging and or extending this
approach to IW planning for the IWFs."
AFRL Project Manager
"This methodology marries well with the AFTTP 3-1, Vol 36
[Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for IO], due out late this
spring."
IO Intel Analyst
Summary of Results—Senior Level. The responses received from this
assessment activity indicated a high approval rate of the different aspects
reviewed by the participants. In addition, an overall positive and supporting
assessment of the usefulness to the IO community of the different aspects was
also found.
5.2

Summary
The analysis of the two assessment activities seems to support an initial

overall positive response to the concepts, definitions, and processes suggested
within this research. The Presentation assessment seems to indicate that the
suggested process appears to be easy to use and useful. The other aspects,

5-9

definitions and the information environment seemed to be well accepted as
useful.
The Senior Level assessment also indicated high approval in all aspects
of the assessment. In addition, this group seems to agree that the concepts and
process developed in this research would be useful to the 10 community and is
just a beginning for further research needed in this area.
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6
6.1

Conclusions and Recommendations

Research Conclusions
The Air Force has publicly acknowledged the importance of the

information environment by declaring that it should be considered a realm with its
own characteristics just as land, sea, air, and space (Cornerstones, 1995: 8). In
addition, it also suggests that information has evolved from being a supporting
function to being a weapon itself (AFDD 2-5,1998:1-2). This acknowledgement
is the first step in identifying the need to take action. This research is the next
step to identifying the necessary concepts and definitions in attempting to give
shape to the information environment as a realm and a potential weapon option.
This research has focused on answering the question,
"How can offensive IW be integrated within the AF as a primary
weapon choice?"
An exploratory research of constant comparison, progressive analysis,
clarification, and evolving conclusions was conducted through field observations,
informal interviews, and literature reviews. The research boundaries were set to
investigate the AF's offensive component of IW and the affects of single offensive
actions.
Although the research identified several important facts about IO, several
components necessary to forming a framework were not found and required
development and definition. A summary of the items required to transform
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offensive IW into a supported and primary weapon option are outlined in Table 61.
Table 6-1. Research Results

Facts about IO
AF IO mission—Establish and Maintain
Information Superiority
AF's Organizational Structure—NAF
and Aerospace Operations Center
IO Planner's Deliverables—Target
Nominations, Weapneered Targets,
Assessment Indicators
Personnel/Manpower—IW Flights

Developed Components
Redefining the Offensive IW mission—
Precision Engagement
Goal of offensive IW—Affecting
Information Factors
The IW Battlespace—Target Sets,
Effect Points, Costs, and Measures of
Effectiveness
Understanding the Decision
Environment—Information Factors
IO Planning Process—Effects based,
Weapon Characteristics, and Effects
Assessment Indicators

This research has attempted to take doctrine and the current Air Force
environment and identify a way to transform offensive IW from a supporting
function of Information Superiority to a primary weapon option with a focus on
Precision Engagement. It proposes a change in this focus only to compliment
the supporting and necessary functions associated with obtaining information
superiority.
This research has resulted in various concepts, definitions, and a
suggested process in order to help form a framework to be used at the
operational and tactical level of operations and within the current AF
organizational structure.
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6.2

Limitations of the Research
Warfighting requires the synergistic integration of all capabilities (land,

sea, air, and space, as well as information) available to be able to appropriately
task and expend the correct resources for the right end or desired result. This
research is focused upon outlining the Air Force environment with respect to the
offensive, single action IW capabilities. Although this can be seen as an overall
limitation, knowing the affect of a single action was required as the environment
was deciphered and decomposed to identify the possible points that can affect a
system. Synergistic combinations can only be built upon the combining of known
single actions. In addition, the focus upon the offensive component of
Information Warfare, was chosen because knowing what and how a system or
environment can be affect or attacked will automatically identify the necessary
defensive actions to protect it. Defending systems without knowing what and
how it can be attacked can result in a wasteful, unfocused, and reactive defense
plan.
6.3

Recommendations for Future Research
Information Warfare, which is comprised of both defensive and offensive

actions, requires extensive and continued research in order for it to continue to
evolve into a primary weapon option within the Air Force. The suggestions
identified here pertain to this specific research effort.
The process suggested in this research requires further decomposition to
be able to be used within the day-to-day operations of the AF IW operations.
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Appendix A provides a concept and procedure in attempting to decipher and
decompose the IW battlespace. Through several pilot studies conducted during
the course of this research, it became apparent that a repository of generic
targets and possible offensive actions could be identified using this procedure. A
research opportunity exists for the comprehensive decomposition of the IW
battlespace.
Another research opportunity would be to conduct a field validation of the
suggested process. Although the process has been defined and received an
initial positive assessment, a field experiment would help to identify the strengths,
weaknesses, and limitations of the definitions, concepts, and process.
One of the major deliverables of the 10 planner is the development of
target nominations and assessment indicators. Another research opportunity lies
in attempting to validate the concepts and definitions proposed within the IW
Weaponeering and Force Application phase of the suggested process. The
concepts and definitions can be tested by actually trying to develop target
aimpoints, weapon characteristics, and appropriate assessment indicators.
6.4

Recommendations
The 10 community has come a long way since the release of

Cornerstones in 1995 and the acknowledgement that the information realm had
its own characteristics as do land, sea, air, and space. It has gone through a
great deal of refining since then, but as this research has shown (reference Table
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6-1), it still has a long way to go as it attempts to integrate IO into the current AF
environment.
There are many hurdles facing the IO community, but three are identified
here with possible recommendations for action. The first is the reluctance of the
community to separately analyze and identify the requirements of the two pillars
of IW; attack and defend. This thesis postulates that awareness and knowledge
of possible offensive actions upon its battlespace must be identified and
analyzed before a proactive approach to integrating IO can take place. Although
offensive actions must be closely integrated with the defensive component,
offensive capabilities of oneself and ones opponents should drive and determine
its defense. Using a football analogy, a team cannot win or score without
engaging its strengths and capabilities upon the opponent's weaknesses in its
offensive plays towards the goal. Although a good defense may keep the
opponents from scoring, it does very little towards moving the team towards its
ultimate goal of winning. As suggested above, awareness and knowledge about
offensive capabilities (both our own and the adversary) must be identified in
order to better defend and ultimately act and win. Until the offensive side of IW is
proactively identified, analyzed, and cataloged, IW will always remain in a
reactive and supporting role.
The second hurdle can easily be surpassed by focusing offensive IW on
accomplishing precision engagement. This goal goes hand in hand with the
above recommendation of proactively analyzing the offensive component of IW
and how precise engagement must be accomplished. This recommendation
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does not lessen the importance of the current 10 mission of achieving Information
Superiority, but emphasizes its importance and the necessity of supporting the
other and essential core competencies, including precision engagement in the
ultimate goal of accomplishing strategy and objectives. The capabilities of
offensive IW must use the benefits of information superiority towards identifying
the required factors in the attainment of engaging its actions and weapons in a
precise manner.
The third hurdle is the lack of an IW specific battlespace with its own
characteristics to conduct military operations. IW must proactively start to
identify its own target sets along with effects points, costs of deployment, and
measures of effectiveness.
The 10 community faces many hurdles in its integration efforts within the
AF, however incorporation of the above recommendations could definitely aid in
succinctly positioning itself as a separate realm with its own characteristics. The
IW Battlespace, associated concepts, and proposed process introduced in this
research would be a great starting point in setting the framework for the
integration of 10 within the AF as a primary weapon option.
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A.1

Appendix—Research Extension

Introduction
The purpose of this appendix is to introduce the next step in

vectoring offensive IW as a primary weapon option within the current AF
environment. This appendix is an informal extension of the proposed process
with the main objective of decomposing the IW Battlespace in support of
accomplishing the IO Planner's target nomination deliverable and acquiring a
better knowledge of offensive IW actions.
To conduct offensive IW actions at the operational and tactical level of
operations, there are three important knowledge requirements; battlefield
characteristics, adversary's characteristics, and our own weapon characteristics
and capabilities (AFI13-1AOC, 1999: 8). The process proposed presents several
different ideas and concepts, which begin to address some of the knowledge
requirements of the battlefield. These concepts are listing below.
a. A realignment of the offensive IW objective (Affect Information Factors
to Induce the Desired Decision to achieve the Desired Effects)
b. An IW Battlespace of common Target Sets and Effect Point
c. A common planning process aligned with the targeting cycle and
focused on end products/deliverables

The knowledge of the adversary's characteristics can be identified by the
intelligence function termed the intelligence preparation of the battlespace. In the
past, much of this support function has been focused upon the collection
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requirements for the deployment of conventional methods of defensive and
offensive actions. The information requirements to deploy 10 weapons have
been identified as a challenge to the intelligence community, requiring
unprecedented levels of detail through compressed collection timelines to
collecting and analyzing new types of intelligence never before required (AFP 14210,1998: 83). In addition, it will take a collaborative effort of operations,
intelligence, and technical communities to identify what recurring information is
truly needed to conduct IO actions (AFP 14-210,1998: 83). Collecting
EVERYTHING is expensive, time consuming, and wasteful. Focusing collection
efforts, however, requires specific goals, methods, and objectives.
The next piece of the IW puzzle is knowledge of our own weapons
capabilities. The IW Weaponeering and Force Application phase of the proposed
process can be separated into weapon characteristics, level of effort, measures
of effectiveness, and effects assessment indicators. Although the details of the
action's deployment will be driven by the specific situation and theatre
characteristics and can only be determined at the time of action deployment,
there is a level of commonality that can and must be identified to aid planners,
targeteers, intelligence collectors, and assessment analyst. This proposed next
step is an attempt to capture this level of commonality. Table A-1 below
summaries the three main knowledge requirements identified earlier in this
appendix.
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Table A-1 .Summary of Knowledge Requirements
IW Battlespace Characteristics
Information
Increase info needed for awareness
Increase age of info
Increase error content
Decrease completeness of info
Information Systems
Reduce Bandwidth
Reduce Throughput
Increase error induced by system
Decrease completeness induced by system
Increase recovery rate
Defeat physical hardness
Defeat security measures and processes
Defeat detection system
Information Based Processes
Increase consumption of essential resources
Increase consumption of essential time
Reduce timeliness of process
Reduce accuracy of process
Reduce focus of process
Reduce Resilience of process
Adversary's Characteristics
Vulnerabilities
Threat Capabilities
Normal Intel Relationships
IO specific relationships
Information Decision Characteristics
IW Weapon Characteristics
Capabilities
What can it affect and how?
Method of Delivery
Method
Platform
Payload
Limitations and Weaknesses
What can it affect and how?
Countermeasures?
Info needed to deploy
Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs)
Weapon
Method
Mission

A.2 The Proposed Next Step
In order to do a better job of identifying and acquiring the knowledge
needed to use offensive IW actions effectively, all three knowledge areas must
be improved. The proposed process presented attempts to improve and create a
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common view of the IW battlespace, which can serve as a starting point across
the community. This will also help in the collection efforts of our adversary's
characteristics.
The next few paragraphs is the proposed next step to improving our
knowledge of offensive IW weapon/action capabilities. The approach will also
aid in identifying recurring and specific intelligence collection requirements.
The goal of the next step is to take the initial results and to create a "living'
repository of offensive actions and weapon capabilities (at a categorical level).
This could then be used at the operational level of operations as a starting point
to further decompose the information realm (IW Battlespace) and to arrive at
specific and area of interest target aimpoint nominations. The process/procedure
uses brainstorming to identify possible actions to attack or affect the information
realm and incorporates the concepts within the IW Weaponeering and Force
Application Phase of the proposed 10 planning process.
Phase II—IW Weaponeering and Force Application.
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Figure A-1 represents

Effects Based Target Development
IW Weaponeering & Force Application
Level of Effect
■ Manipulate & Destroy

Weapon Characteristics
" Weapon System
•Delivery Tactic and Platform
•Payload

Ik

<:
Parameters to Consider

Measures of Effectiveness

•T2Q2C

• Attack upon Aimpoint

Effects Assessment Indicators
• Triggers/Flags/Activities to watch to assess

success or failure

_Weaponeered Targets & EA Indicators^

A

Force Execution
IW Combat-Assessment Analysis
Effectiveness Analysis

Figure A- I.Phase I—IW Weaponeering & Force Application

The brainstorming session is made up of a variety of subject matter
experts. The suggested procedure uses the information realm and associated
effect points as its IW battlespace baseline. Measures of effectiveness and
weapon characteristics are the essential building blocks in identifying delivery
methods, platform, payload, and effects assessment indicators.
The session can be broken down into two distinct steps. It is important to
note that these sessions are focused upon the IW Battlespace's target sets and
effect points as presented within this research. Therefore, the inputs into Phase
II—IW Weaponeering and Force Application are the target and desired effects.
Although, this phase can be used for both traditional kinetic weapon systems, it is
used in the session to identifying IW weapon actions. The two steps are
summarized in Table A- 2 below.
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Table A- 2. Summary of Steps of Brainstorming Session
Phase 1—Weapon/Action Characteristics Identification
How can we affect (devalue) this effect point of the IW Battlespace?
Identify methods
Which D (deny, disrupt, degrade, destroy) applies with the specific
Identify level of effort
method?
Identify the possible payloads for What will be required to damage or affect the target?
each method
What will be required to get the payload to the desired target?
Identify the possible platforms to
be used for each method
Note: Time, timing, quality, quantity, and costs are applied and determined at the time of deployment of
the action.
Phase 2—Effects Assessment Indicator Identification
What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us if the
Identify triggers, flags, or events
weapon characteristics (method, platform, or payload) SUCCEEDED
that are focused on method,
as planned?
platform, or payload success or
failure
What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us if the
weapon characteristics (method, platform, or payload) FAILED as
planned?
What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us if we
Identify triggers, flags, or events
SUCCEEDED at affecting the correct attribute or effect point?
that are focused on the
characteristics of the measures
What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us if we
of effectiveness
FAILED at affecting the correct attribute or effect point?

Once the weapon characteristics are identified, as outlined in the above
table, appropriate effects assessment indicators (EAIs) are identified for each
weapon action. Once weapon capabilities and actions are identified several
other areas become possible. Some of the benefits are listed in Table A- 3.
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Table A- 3. Benefits of Identifying Weapon Characteristics

Improved Understanding of Action/Weapon Modification and Development
Possibilities and Requirements
Method Variations
Payload Variations
Platform Variations
Improved Understanding and Identification of Information, Intel Collection,
and Action Deployment Requirements
1 Recurring (common across the battlespace)
1 Specific (to the AOI or circumstance)
Improved Understanding and Identification of Information Assurance
Posture Requirements
Offensive Action Possibilities
Countermeasure Action Requirements
Defensive Action Requirements(Policies and
Procedures)
Infrastructure Requirements (Software, Hardware,
Configuration)
Manpower Requirements (Attacker and Defender)

In addition to the above benefits, a repository of weapon
capabilities/actions and their possible EAIs can be identified and passed on to all
10 planners to be used and improved upon during both deliberate and crisis
action planning phases. The identification of the possible weapon
capabilities/actions can possibly ensure a baseline of knowledge and help
creative thinking to begin at a broader and higher level.
A.3 Informal Studies
In order to test and refine the procedures of this next step, several studies
were performed during the course of this research. The purpose of these studies
was twofold. The first purpose was an attempt to verify that the concepts used in
the developed process could be applied across the 10 environment. These
concepts are weapon methods, delivery platform, payload, and effects
A-7

assessment indicators (EAIs). The second was to identify a procedure or
exercise that would begin to further decompose the offensive objective hierarchy
(target sets and effect points) in systematic and simple way that could possibly
be used in the day-to-day operations of an 10 Planner. In addition, the
information identified would then be used to populate a repository of common
actions for each effect point within the battlespace. The hypothesis was, "that
the IW battlespace was comprised of a level of commonality where
decomposition could take place and a better understanding of the types of
offensive actions could be realized".
A.4 An Initial and Subjective Analysis
Several groups were asked to participate in the informal studies. Two of
the sessions analyzed the same IW Battlespace attribute, bandwidth. In support
of the hypothesis, both groups tended to identify similar types of actions. The
results of both groups are listed in Table A- 4 below.
Table A-4. Results of Sessions
Effect Point: Reduce Bandwidth
Group 2—AFIWC Members
Group 1—AFIT IW Students
Reconfigure HW
Reconfigure Equipment
Affect Comm Nodes
Destroy Links
Distributed DOS
Distributed DOS
Send Virus
Virus
Electronic Jamming
Increase Traffic
Note: Items are not prioritized or in any specific order

A.5 Conclusion
The main objective of this appendix is to introduce a procedure that will
aid in decomposing the IW Battlespace and acquiring a better knowledge of
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offensive IW actions. It incorporates some of the concepts identified during the
course of the research; effect points, weapon characteristics, and effects
assessment indicators.
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Appendix—IW Battlespace

The purpose of this appendix is to consolidate all products pertaining to
the Offensive IW Battlespace. The IW Battlespace and Costs diagrams are
included in "full" size in this appendix for easier reference and viewing. In
addition, two other products are included to accompany these diagrams and act
as quick reference (crib) sheets. The first is a narrative, which attempts to list the
different aspects of the IW Battlespace in a consolidated format. The second
item is the Measures of Effectiveness Table. This is also meant to be a quick
reference item to be used as needed or more specifically within the exercise or
brainstorming sessions.
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Offensive IW Battlespace—Target Sets and Efffect Points
Goals, Definitions, Actions, Effects, and Measures
This product is meant to compliment both the IW Battlespace—Target Sets and Effect
Point and Cost diagrams. It is a quick reference guide that attempts to list the different aspects of
the IW Battlespace in a consolidated format.
The offensive objectives presented here were first introduced as the Value Hierarchy for
the Information Realm and the Objectives Hierarchy for Offensive Information Operations and
created by Capt Michael P. Doyle as part of his thesis research in 1998. Incorporation of these
hierarchies into this research proved beneficial, but also required several modifications. This
appendix represents the modified version. One major modification was the incorporation of the
overall goals of Information Operations as described below.
The reference is set up in the following format.
1. Overall goals of Information Operations
1a. Strategic goals
1b. Operational and Tactical Goals
1c. Definition
1d. Offensive IO Objective (OIO) Actions
2.

Information component (Target Set)
2a. Definition

Underlined and Bolded

Bolded
Underlined and Bolded

3. Information subcomponent
3a. Definition

Underlined

4. Information component attributes (Effect Points)
4a. Definition
4b. Affected by:
4c: Offensive IO Objective (OIO)
4d. Possible Level of Effect of OIO Action
4e. Desired Effect
4f. Measurement

Numbered and Bolded

Overall Goals of Information Operations
The goal of strategic level Information Operations is to influence the hearts and minds of
our adversaries by affecting the decision maker and his or her decision making process.
The goal of operational and tactical level of Information Operations is to affect
information factors to induce a desired decision to achieve a desired effect. This is done
by manipulation and destruction of the information realm in order to induce a decision of
the adversary that benefits friendly forces.
OIO Actions: Control the Potential Effect -3 alternatives
Cause to Reject Truth—when the adversary is presented with the truth—rejects
the truth—likely to accept the false
Effect: Causes the adversary to doubt true information
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Cause to Accept False—when the adversary is presented with the false—
accepts the false—likely to reject the truth
Effect: Causes the adversary to accept the false reality
Cause to Accept Truth/Reject False—Sees reality clearly—lifts fog in a
believable way
Effect: Leads the adversary to the correct decision
Measurement: Level of expected effect on decision
Probability/Category: High, medium, low probability or no change
Information—Data and its semantic meaning that conveys the intended message.
It has no mass, physical form, and causes no action
(1) Information Needed for Awareness—the minimum amount of
information to update an existing body of knowledge in a manner that either
changes the current picture or reduces uncertainty of the current picture. The
value of info is linked to the amount of info required to update the decision
maker's current understanding or picture of the decision environment.
Affected by:

Amount and quality of info already held (body of knowledge)
Amount and quality of the new info received

OIO Objective: Increase Information Needed for Awareness
OIO Action:

Manipulate & destroy information needed

Desired Effect: Force adversary to need an increasing amount of
information in order to maintain the same level of awareness.
Measurement: Level of support required to maintain awareness level.
Category: Maintenance Level (Hardware), System Operator Level (System
Software), User/self fix Level (User Apps), no change or effect to updates
(2) Age of Information—Timeliness (age) provides value to the decision
making process. The subject of the information will drive the amount of time
required between updates in order to maintain its value. Info is devalued as time
passes.
Affected by: The number of time cycles increase, information value is reduced
by the increasing uncertainty of the battlespace.
OIO Objective: Devalue/Increase Age of Information (As time passes, the value
of the information is reduced with respect to decision making—increasing
decision maker's uncertainty about the battlespace)
OIO Action: Manipulate and destroy updates to information
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Desired Effect: Reduce the timeliness of new or existing information to the
adversary.
Measurement: Number of change cycles since update.
Quantity: 0-5 cycle times (Information more than 5 change cycles old is no
longer valuable.)
Fidelity—ability to convey, stores, and manipulate complete information without
adding or allowing error to be added (information integrity). The components of
the fidelity are error content and message completeness.
(3) Error Content—The amount of aggregate errors in the relayed
message
Affected by: Information manipulation or destruction
OIO Objective: Increase Error Content of Message
010 Action: Manipulate & destroy content of message
Desired Effects: Prevent the correct message/information from being
received.
Measurement: Percentage of error content in message
Percentage: 0 to 100%
(4) Completeness of Message—Ability to convey a complete message
Affected by: Information manipulation and destruction
OIO Objective: Decrease Completeness of Message
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy completeness of message
Desired Effect: Prevent a complete message from being received
Measurement: Relative amount of meaning retained
Category: No meaning, major degrade, minor degrade, no change
Information Systems—Any physical component that conveys, stores, or
processes information without adding value to the decision making process. It
provides physical form and sets it to motion
(5) Bandwidth—The amount of information that can traverse simultaneously.
Affected by: Amount of necessary bandwidth available
OIO Objective: Reduce Bandwidth
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010 Action: Manipulate & destroy available/relative bandwidth
Desired Effect: Affect the relative amount of bandwidth necessary for continued
operations.
Measurement: Relative level of bandwidth available
Category: Stopping/preventing, greatly reducing, moderately reducing, no
change.
(6) Throughput—The amount of signal that a system can send in a given
amount of time.
Affected by: Amount of signal that a system can send in a given amount of time.
010 Objective: Reduce Throughput
010 Action: Manipulate & destroy available throughput
Desired Effect: Affect the amount of throughput available
Measurement: Relative level of throughput available
Category: Stopping, greatly reducing, moderately reducing, no change.
Fidelity—ability to convey, stores, and manipulate complete information without
system error being added. The components of the fidelity are error content and
message completeness.
(7) Error Content—The amount of aggregate errors in the relayed
message
Affected by: System induced (transmission or reception) error
010 Objective: Increase Error Content
010 Action: Manipulate & destroy system induced message error
Desired Effect: Disable the receiver to discriminate the message
properly.
Measurement: Percentage of error content on system
Percentage: 0 to 100%
(8) Completeness of Message—Ability to convey a complete message
independent of system errors
Affected by: Induced and system noise
OIO Objective: Decrease Completeness of Message
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010 Action: Manipulate & destroy completeness of message
Desired Effect: Prevent a complete message from being received.
Measurement: Relative amount of meaning retained
Category: No meaning, major degrade, minor degrade, no change
Defeat Security—The level of security the system provides to the decision maker
both in secure capability and intrusion detection. It is based on how hard it is to
physically penetrate the system, how quickly it can recover from a degraded
state, how difficulty encountered when attempting to physically penetrate it.
(9) Recovery Rate (How long to recover)—The amount of time that is
required for a system to recover from a degraded condition (virtual
hardness)
Affected by: The ability for the system to return to full operating capacity.
010 Objective: Increase recovery time
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy recovery time of system
Desired Effect: To increase the amount of time it takes for system to be
recovered.
Measurement: Number of change cycles over which system is unable to
perform mission. The number of adversary's missed decision cycle.
Quantity: 0-5 cycles (Any out of service time greater than 5 change
cycles offer no more value to the attacker)
Defeat Overall Security Capability—The non-physical protection (security
measures and processes) of a system.
(10) Effort to penetrate physical hardness—The level of
difficulty associated with overcoming the physical protection of the
system. This could include physical, active, and passive
defenses.
Affected by: Difficulty to penetrate hardness of system
OIO Objective: Penetrate physical security of system
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy physical hardness of system
Desired Effect: To physically degrade, disrupt, or destroy a
system.
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Measurement: Level of defeat affected
Category: Completely defeat, moderately defeat, slightly defeat,
no change (no capability)
(11) Security Measures and Processes (Classification)—The
ability to communicate without revealing the message content to
unauthorized elements.
Affected by: Compromises to the non-physical security measures
and processes
OIO Objective: Defeat security measures and processes
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy security measures and
processes of system
Desired Effect: To overcome security measures and processes
(encryption, firewalls, classification levels, etc)
Measurement: Likelihood of gaining access to system
Probability/category: High probability, moderate probability, low
probability, and no change
(12) Intrusion Detection—The ability to detect, locate, and report
intrusion to the system.
Affected by: Ability to by-pass intrusion detection systems
OIO Objective: Defeat detection system
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy detection system
Desired Effect: Penetrate the system with the desired detection
effect.
Measurement: Expected ability to defeat the adversary's intrusion
detection methods with desired effect.
Category: Low, medium, high, and certain effect.
Information-Based Processes—Any element that adds value to information and
decision making processEfficiency—The proper utilization of resources; personnel, equipment, software,
other related materiel, and the amount of processing time of specific information
(13) Essential Resources Consumed—The consumption of essential
and required resources of a process.
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Affected by: Resources allotted to a process or diverted from others
OIO Objective: Increase Consumption of Essential Resources
010 Action: Manipulate & destroy availability of essential resources
Desired Effect: Increase the level of resources consumed by having
items destroyed, replaced, disrupted, or supplemented. Consider finite
resources that can be diverted from other processes
Measurement: Consumption of Essential Resources
Percentage: 0 to 100%
(14) Essential Time Consumed— The consumption of essential and
required time of a process.
Affected by: Relative value of time consumed at the expense of other
processes
OIO Objective: Increase Consumption of Essential Time
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy availability of essential time required
Desired Effect: Increase the amount of time an adversary must allocate
to a process to maintain a given level of support—relative time consumed
Measurement: Consumption of essential time
Percentage: 0 to 100%
Effectiveness—Information must support decision making in real time or must
reduce long-term uncertainty about the battlespace
(15) Timeliness—The availability of value-added products and
information when needed.
Affected by: Ability to provide products in a timely manner
OIO Objective: Reduce timeliness of process
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy availability of essential time
Desired Effect: Affect the receipt of the information, degrading or
rendering information useless for the decision at hand.
Measurement: Number of change cycles that the processed product is
late
Quantity: 0 to 3 decision cycles (Product or info loses all value after 3
cycles)

B-10

(16) Accuracy—Information must be integrated and fused properly into
an accurate product that is reliable and enhances decision-making.
Affected by: Degrading accuracy of tools and products used in decisionmaking
OIO Objective: Reduce accuracy of process
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy accuracy of process
Desired Effect: Decrease accuracy of products from normal operating
standards, degrading correct and consistent analysis
Measurement: Degradation to process accuracy
Percentage: Degradation (0 to 100%)
(17) Focus—The ability to direct a course of action in a desired direction
or accomplishment of a specific task.
Affected by: Ability to actively direct a desired course or direction
OIO Objective: Reduce Focus on Process
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy focus of process
Desired Effect: Direct the process away from its intended use or towards
the desired direction
Measurement: Expected ability to redirect process
Category: Completely redirect, moderately degraded, slightly degraded,
no change
(18) Resilience—The ability of the process to adapt to unexpected
occurrences and still provide value to the decision maker and decision
making process
Affected by: Susceptibility to failure or degradation
OIO Objective: Reduce Resilience of process
OIO Action: Manipulate & destroy adaptability of process
Desired Effect: Force adversary to change tools/processes/leadership
affecting the ability to adapt and recover.
Measurement: Expected ability to reduce adaptability or recovery of
process
Category: Catastrophic failure, moderately degraded, slightly degraded,
no change
B-11

Cost Objectives (values 0 to 100%)
(C-1) Friendly personnel at risk—The cost of losing or injuring friendly
personnel
Affected by: Exposure to injury or death
OIO Objective: Minimize Friendly Personnel at Risk
Desired Effect: Minimize the relative risk of friendly personnel being injured or
killed
Measurement: Relative Level of Risk
Percentage: 0 - 100% zero risk to high risk
Slight risk: Losses not expected
Moderate risk: Losses are expected
High risk: Losses are certain
(C-2) Sensitive Info at risk—The cost of exposure of sensitive info or
technology—information/methods. Once exposed it will be available for others to
use.
Affected by: Exposure to adversary's intelligence gathering
OIO Objective: Maintain sensitive information security
Desired Effect: Keep sensitive information or technology from exposure, which
could lead to usage by adversary
Measurement: Expected level of proliferation
Percentage: 0-100% (Probability of proliferation)
(C-3) Weapon system survivability—The ability for the system to survive the
mission. There are one-way systems, which survive if they reach the target, and
reusable systems if they can be recovered from the mission.
Affected by: System characteristics and ability to recover
OIO Objective: Maximize system survivability
Desired Effect: Plan for required actions to recover appropriate/applicable
systems
Measurement: Expected probability of survival
Probability: 0 to 100% (linear increments)

B-12

(C-4) Collateral Damage—The secondary damage while striking a target. It
includes, but not limited to the untended loss of allied personnel, noncombatants,
destruction of cultural or sanctuaries and other places of cultural significance.
Affected by: Untended effects or damage
OIO Objective: Minimize Collateral Damage
Desired Effect: Minimize the effects of collateral damage from chosen offensive
action.
Measurement: Expected level of collateral damage (percentage of damage)
Percentage: 0-100%
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Appendix—Research Instruments

This appendix is included as a repository of all of the research instruments
used to request, present, or collect data. This appendix is made up of three
different "packages" of instruments; presentation assessment, senior level
assessment, and research extension exercise. The following paragraphs will
briefly describe the purpose of the packages and how each package was used.
C.1

Presentation Assessment
The purpose of the presentation-briefing package is a vehicle to help

acquire face validity of the concepts and process developed by those participants
that may not be willing to read through the actual report. The first document is
the research request sheet. This sheet is used to communicate the research
objective, time required to present, the benefits, and the importance of the
research. The second item in the package is the briefing that was presented to
all participants. This is a powerpoint presentation that is used to communicate
the background, the research intent, the concepts, the process, and future
research. It contains some key points within the note pages. The third item is
the data collection document used for individual feedback of presentation
participants. The objective of this was to solicit the participant's opinion on the
usefulness of the concepts and process.

C-1

C.2 Senior Level
Although the appendix only holds the senior level critique form, the senior
level package consist of a report outlining the background, the concepts, the
process, and the next step for future research. The report used in this review
resembles Chapter 4 of this thesis. The purpose of this package was to be able
to forward the report with a critique form to senior and mid-level 10 managers for
their viewpoint and suggestions.
C.3 Research Extension Exercise
The exercise package is similar to the presentation package, but is used
for the "future" research called the next step (Appendix A). The purpose of the
exercise is to identify IW weapon capabilities using the concepts presented in the
research through the use of semi-structure brainstorming.
An exercise research objective sheet was included in this package as well.
It was also used to communication the exercise's objectives, time required of its
participants, benefits to the participant, and the importance of this research. In
addition, the package consisted of an exercise briefing, which was used to
visually present the concepts and definitions used within the exercise. The
exercise narrative complimented and worked hand-in-hand with the briefing. The
exercise narrative was a script or guide for the briefing and brainstorming
session. The last document in this package was the exercise critique. Similar to
the presentation critique, it's objective was to assess the usefulness, the
usability, and the improvement recommendations from the individual participant.

C-2

Presentation Assessment Research Objectives: Acquire face validity of the developed
process and derived concepts.
This will be done by presenting the definitions, concepts, and process in a briefing to subject
matter experts currently assigned to an IW Flight. A one-page critique sheet will be used as a
mechanism to assess the face validity of the usability and usefulness of the definitions, concepts,
and process.
Time Required: 1-1 Yz hours. The presentation should take approximately 45-60 minutes.
Filling out the one page critique should take approximately 5-10 minutes.
Benefits of the Experiment to you
1. Exposure to an offensive IW-focused planning model.
2. Exposure to the development of weapon characteristics and applicable EAIs.
Why is this research important?
This research will attempt to fill voids that exist in the implementation of IO/IW within the
Air Force. There are three important missing links; dimensions of the infosphere affecting the
decisions of an organization, a focus on the primary goal of offensive IW at the tactical level of
operations, and IW weapon knowledge, that are not accounted for in any doctrine or operational
concept.
Currently, written guidance given to IO planners is focused on the state of the adversary
and influencing the decision maker and his/her process. Although, these are very important
pieces of the battlespace (know your enemy), proactively matching/modifying/building IW
weapons and strength capabilities to exploit vulnerabilities of the adversary is the other very
important piece of the battlespace that is not explicitly addressed or discussed.
In order to build a stage for this type of knowledge to evolve, this research has identified
the other two essential pieces; dimensions or the environment of IW and a definition of the
primary goal of Offensive IW at the tactical level of operations. In addition, a process is proposed
to help to further identify the required components within the Air Force environment.
Several documents that guide IO development within the Air Force outline several
concepts or requirements that this research may play a role in accomplishing.
Joint Vision 2020
1. It attempts to develop compatible processes and procedures
2. It leverages the advantage of a systematic and new capability model
3. Weapon knowledge necessary to exploit adversary's weaknesses
AF IO Concept of Operations
1. This helps to implement IO at the operational level
2. It provides a good use of the "total" battlespace by matching our weapon "strengths"
to the adversary's weaknesses.
Concept of Operations for Effects Based Operations (Draft)
1. Focus is placed on the "effects" of an action by attempting to identify applicable and
appropriate MOEs and EAIs
2. IO weapon characteristics will combine commander's intent/objectives, assessment
indicators, and assessment feedback loop
italicized items are concepts and requirements presented within the applicable
document
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After- Presentation Feedback Form
PART1
For each question, mark the box with an "X" that most closely matches your opinion.

1. Does the process seem easy to use?
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

No opinion

Agree

Strongly Agree

2. Does the process seem useful for identifying different types of actions to
be taken?
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
No opinion
Agree
Strongly Agree

PART 2—What part of the presentation would you use in the future?
Place a circle around (or a line of Xs next to) the "bolded" areas that you would use and write
down any changes, additions, or modifications in the space provided below each concept.
a. Process
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it?

b. Concepts
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info
Factors
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points
4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs)
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it?

c. Other, please add any not identified above.
How would you incorporate your input into the current process?

C-4

PART 3—What part of the presentation would you NOT use in the future?
Place a circle around those you would NOT use and write down any changes, additions, or
modifications to the area in order for you to use it.
a.
Process
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable you to use it?

b.

Concepts
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info
Factors
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points
4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs)

If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable you to use it?

C-5

Senior Level Feedback Form
PART1
For each question, mark the box with an "X" that most closely matches your opinion.
Use the space below each answer for any comments you may have.
1. What is your opinion of the PROCESS presented in the research?
Strongly Disapprove

Disapprove

No opinion

Approve

Strongly Approve

2. What is your opinion of the CONCEPTS presented in the research?
IW as a Primary Weapon Option
Strongly Disapprove Disapprove
No opinion

Approve

Strongly Approve

Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info Factors
Strongly Disapprove Disapprove
No opinion
Approve
Strongly Approve

IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points
Strongly Disapprove Disapprove
No opinion

Approve

Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs)
Strongly Disapprove Disapprove
No opinion
Approve

Strongly Approve

Strongly Approve

PART 2—What part of the research do you see as useful to the IO community?
Place a circle around (or a line of Xs next to) the "bolded" areas that you would use and write
down any changes, additions, or modifications in the space provided below each concept.
a. Process
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it?

b. Concepts
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the
Info Factors
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points
C-6

4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators
(EAIs)
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it?

c. Other, please add any not identified above.
How would you incorporate your input into the current process?

PART 3—What part of the research do you see as NOT useful to the 10
community?
Place a circle around (or a line of Xs next to) those you would NOT use and write down any
changes, additions, or modifications to the area in order for you to use it.
a. Process
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable you to
use it?

b.

Concepts
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info
Factors
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points

4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs)
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable you to use it?

PART 4—General Comments
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Research Extension Objectives: Validate the concepts of the IW Weaponeering and
Force Application Phase of the proposed 10 Planning Process.
This will be done by using the definitions and concepts of the proposed process through
a structured brainstorm session in order to identify 10 weapon characteristics and
applicable Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs)
Time Required: 2-2 34 hours. Administrative information and a brief background will
take approximately 10-15 minutes. The rest of the time is allotted for the brainstorming
session.
Benefits of the Experiment to you
1. Exposure to a comprehensive planning model and procedures on how to employ
it.
2. Exposure to the development of weapon characteristics and applicable EAIs.
Why is this research important?
This research will attempt to fill voids that exist in the implementation of IO/IW at
the tactical level. There are two important missing links in today's environment; new
dimensions of the infosphere affecting the decision making process and IW weapon
knowledge, that are not accounted for in any doctrine or operational concept.
Currently, guidance given to IO planners is focused on the state of the adversary.
Although, this is a very important piece of the battlespace (know your enemy),
proactively matching/modifying/building IW weapons and strength capabilities to exploit
vulnerabilities of the adversary is the other very important piece of the battlespace that is
not explicitly addressed or discussed.
Several documents that guide IO development within the Air Force outline
several concepts or requirements that this research may play a role in accomplishing.
Joint Vision 2020
4. It attempts to develop compatible processes and procedures
5. It leverages the advantage of a systematic and new capability model
6. Weapon knowledge necessary to exploit adversary's weaknesses
AF IO Concept of Operations
3. This helps to implement 10 at the operational level
4. It provides a good use of the "total"battlespace by matching our weapon
"strengths" to the adversary's weaknesses.
Concept of Operations for Effects Based Operations (Draft)
3. Focus is placed on the "effects" of an action by attempting to identify
applicable and appropriate MOEs and EAIs
4. 10 weapon characteristics will combine commander's intent/objectives,
assessment indicators, and assessment feedback loop
italicized items are concepts and requirements presented within the applicable
document
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Exercise Weapon Characteristic and EAI Development
Research Extension--Jan 2001
Introduction-Good Afternoon/Morning
Thank you for volunteering your time in this experiment.
Slide -Agenda
Overview
Expectations
Brainstorm Session
After-Session Critique
Slide -Exercise Objectives
Validate Systematic Approach to action characteristics
You are being asked to participate in a step-by-step and systematic
approach in order to validate a process for identifying how the information,
information systems, and information based processes can be affected, more
specifically, how information can be devalued.
Slide -Exercise Focus
Effects based
Limited to Single Actions
Computer Network Attack (CNA)
Perfect Information Flow
This is very important to remember because following a specific process is
essential, therefore, there may be times, the approach we will be taking may not
be very exciting and may be very obvious...there is a reason for it. Please bear
with me and keep notes of your suggestions and concerns. Your notes can also
be used for the after-session critiques/feedback

1.
2.
3.

4.

Slide -Expectations
You:
Keep an open mind and don't be afraid of being different
Keep the appropriate definitions in mind at all times
Keep your experiment "NOTE SHEET" handy to jot down things you feel can
be done better or in a more appropriate order of presentation. Of course,
comments in general would also be appreciated.
Ask questions if you do not understand!

Facilitator:
1. Keep the group on track and to follow the step-by-step approach
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2. Answer questions with the best of my ability!

The facilitator will be taking you through a series of brainstorming sessions.
All you'll have to do is sit back and participate by thinking outside the box - remember your input/concept could trigger some other angle we never thought
about.
Slide -Forms
Before we get started, I'd like to quickly go over the forms and diagrams you have in
front of you. These will be available to you throughout the exercise.
1. Offensive IO Objective Model
2. Offensive IO Attribute and IO Action Definitions
3. Measures of Effectiveness Table
4. Note Taker
This ends the administrative related items, but before we get into the actual brainstorming
session, I would like to first give you a quick overview of some of the key concepts that will be
used in the exercise.
Slide -Quick Overview
Please be assured that they will be presented AGAIN, within the session, so please do not feel
pressured to having to commit them to memory.
Slide -Information Breakdown—Hierarchy
HANDOUT
We will be looking at the Information Realm and more specifically, how we can devalue
the attributes of this environment. More specifically we will be looking at least, at one of
the attributes from one of the main components of Information, Information Systems,
Information Based Processes
HIDDEN-Slides -Information Environment
Information
Information systems
Information based processes
Slide -Definitions
Actions/Weapon Characteristics Definitions
Tactics
The "How to" of the action or the weapon system in order to effect
the aimpoint as desired.
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Platform
The equipment or system used to transport the product or action to the intended
target
Payload
The active agent or damage (effect) mechanism that "effects" the target.
Levels of Effect
Manipulate
Deny-Not allow temporarily
Detour-Deviate from a direct route or course of action
Delay-Put off to a later time, slow or cause to be late
Degrade-Lower in quality
Disrupt-Disturb or interrupt
Destroy-Wreck, ruin, kill, demolish
Assessment Indicators
Triggers/flags/activities that could signify success or failure
Weapon—The effectiveness of the weapon's or action's effect to
the intended information component and aimpoint.
Method—The effectiveness of the tactics, platform, payload of the
weapon or action chosen.
Mission—The effectiveness of the action's effect on the decision
made.
The Brainstorm Session
Possible Reference Sheet:
Information Realm
1. Given Items: Attribute and Weapon
a.

We will be working on one specific attribute of one of the components at a
time.
The first one we will look at is under the component "Information
Systems" and the attribute of "Reduce Bandwidth".
Facilitator: Use this sequence for each attribute. Bandwidth is used as an
example.
b. The pillar of IO that we will be using is Computer Network Attack
(CNA).
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Goal 1: Identity the weapon (CNA) characteristics that affect the information
component of "information systems" thru the use of devaluing or reducing the
attribute of "bandwidth".
NOTE:
You may have to note "other characteristics" or have participants use their
note takers so no inputs are lost due to timing.
The sequence of identifying platforms and payloads may be intertwined...use
the above caution, but don't squelch creativity.
SEQUENCE—Weapon Characteristics
a. First lets identify those methods or tactics that will "reduce bandwidth"
Goal: Continue til suggestions cease or drift to other attributes or gets
too detailed.
Facilitator: At end and before proceeding group/consolidate "like"
items together to shorten list, if possible.
b. Now that we've listed methods of reducing bandwidth and consolidated like
items, lets look at each one individually and identify the type of platform
needed to deliver the action to the target.
Goal: Continue til suggestions cease or drift to other attributes
Facilitator: Identify a platform for each action, in most cases, the type
of platform may be repeated and limited to just a couple of choices.
c. Now that we've listed the methods and platforms, we now have to identify the
payload for each item.
Goal: Continue til suggestions cease or drift to other attributes
Facilitator: Identify all possible payloads to be used with each method
and platform. Again, you may see a lot of repetition, but continue and treat
each "package" individually.
d. For each package, determine if the package can be used at each level of
effect. For example; For this tactic, delivered with this platform, employing
this payload...answer the following questions: Can it deny bandwidth? Can it
degrade bandwidth? Can it disrupt bandwidth? Can it destroy bandwidth?
Note: Most times, all "Ds" will be possible, but there has been times
where not ALL Ds could be satisfied due to either the platform or payload
being used. Be careful, not to breeze thru this!
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SEQUENCE—Assessment Indicators
a. For each "package" (one tactic, one platform, one payload) determine
applicable assessment indicators.
Identify at least ONE assessment indicator for each type of assessment type
(weapon/action and method—MISSION WILL NOT BE IDENTIFIED)
Note: Sequence is not important. The important item here is identifying at
least one for each type. Use trigger "phrases" to prompt thought to the different
types of indicators.
b. Weapon/Action Effectiveness: For each attribute ask the question; Did the
action devalue what we wanted it to attack; ie. bandwidth of an information
system?
Indicators: What would be possible indicators/triggers that could tell us
if we devalued the correct attribute or component?
Note: Use of the appropriate MOE could/should identify items that
could tell us success or failure of the method.
c. Method Effectiveness: For each method ask the question; Did the method
use tactic/payload/platform achieve the desired affect?
Indicators: What would be the possible indicators/triggers that could
tell us if we had the appropriate effect due to this action?
Note: Use of the appropriate MOE could/should identify items that
could tell us success or failure of the method.
Wrap UP
I would like to thank you for your time and I would appreciate any
comments you may have.
You are welcome to take any handouts you have used during this session.
The only item I ask that you leave behind are your note takers. Again,
thank you for your time. I there are any questions or additional comments, I will
be here after this session.
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After-Exercise Critique
Brainstorm Session
PART1
For each question, mark the box with an "X" that most closely matches your opinion.
1.

Is the process easy to use?

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

No opinion

Agree

Strongly Agree

2. Is the process useful for identifying possible actions to be taken?
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

No opinion

Agree

Strongly Agree

3. Does the process help to identify actions that have the desired effect upon
the Information Realm?
For example: If the desired effect is to reduce bandwidth, does the
process lead you to actions that will "reduce bandwidth"?
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

No opinion

Agree

Strongly Agree

PART 2—What part of the exercise would you use in the future?
Place a circle around or a line of XXXs next to the "bolded" areas that you
would use and write down any changes, additions, or modifications in the space
provided below each concept.
a. Process
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it?

b. Brainstorming Session
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it?

c. Concepts
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the Info
Factors
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3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points
4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs)
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it?

d. IW Battlespace
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications would you make to improve it?

e. Other, please add any not identified above.
How would you incorporate your input into the current process?

PART 3—What part of the exercise would you NOT use in the future?
Place a circle around or a line of XXXXs next to those you would NOT use and write
down any changes, additions, or modifications to the area in order for you to use it.
a. Process
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable
you to use it?

b. Brainstorming Session
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable
you to use it?

c. Concepts
1. IW as a Primary Weapon Option
2. Primary Goal of Offensive IW (Tactical Level): Affect the
Info Factors
3. IW Battlespace: Target Set and Effect Points
4. Assessment Analysis: Effects Assessment Indicators (EAIs)
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable
you to use it?
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d. IW Battlespace
If circled, what changes/additions/modifications could be made that would enable
you to use it?

Comments:
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